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Abstract 
In this thesis I demonstrate that Kant's notion of freedom remains 
consistent throughout his practical philosophy. By examining Kant's notion of 
Wille in the Metaphysics of Morals, we see that finite rational agents can choose 
against the moral law. Some Kant scholars, when interpreting Kant's early moral 
philosophy, omit the possibility that finite rational agents can freely choose 
against the moral law. Instead, they maintain that the only options available to 
finite rational beings are to act in accordance with the moral law, which is a free 
act, or act based on empirical incentives, which is a determined act. Through 
introducing the practical example of suicide, I show that this interpretation 
logically excludes certain acts, as well as removes any notion of moral 
responsibility from Kant's practical philosophy. However, through an 
examination of An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Critique of Practical Reason, 
I follow such commentators as Henry Allison in showing that Kant clearly 
maintains that finite rational agents can freely choose to act against the moral law 
and thus are responsible for all of their actions including their immoral acts. 
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citations. These citations contain Kant's name, an abbreviation pertaining to the title of 
the work, and the Berlin Academy Edition by volume:page number, except in the case of 
the Critique of Pure Reason, which has been cited by the standard AlB page numbers. 
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Metaphysics of Morals 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
Immanuel Kant focuses on the concept of freedom throughout his philosophy. In 
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant shows how it is conceivable that freedom is compatible 
with the causal laws of nature, through his controversial introduction of transcendental 
idealism 1• However, Kant does not demonstrate the reality of freedom2 • In the Critique 
of Practical Reason Kant moves on to claim the reality of freedom through a practical 
point ofview. Thus, through using practical reason, freedom is shown as a fact of reason, 
yet freedom remains theoretically ungrounded. Finally, in the Critique of Judgment Kant 
bridges the concept of freedom to the concept of nature through the faculty of judgment. 
Kant's moral philosophy is not directed at 'what is', or 'what could be', but 
instead 'what ought to be'. Because moral philosophy is structured around 'what ought 
to be' it must be possible for moral agents to make decisions concerning their actions. 
Decisions are only possible if an agent has the freedom to decide. Along with the 
capacity to decide comes the notion of responsibility. If one can decide to do other than 
what one has done then this type of free decision brings with it responsibility. This 
notion of responsibility is explicit in Kant's question of"what ought I to do?'' 
1 Transcendental Idealism claims that we can have no empirical experience of things-in-themselves, and 
thus our experience of objects is through our own cognition, or the subjective concepts of the 
understanding. 
2 In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that reason cannot answer the questions of freedom (i.e. Are 
we free? How do we know if we are free?). Therefore, in order to get insight into the answers regarding 
freedom Kant critiques reason itself. In the 'Third Antinomy,' which deals with freedom, Kant presents a 
thesis and an antithesis. "The thesis argues that aside from the causality in accordance with the laws of 
nature, there is a causality through freedom, while the antithesis denies the later part of the claim" 
(Holzhey, Historical47). Kant thinks that the antithesis of the third antinomy is true for appearances and 
that appearances are subject to human cognition, while the thesis is true of the things-in-themselves and is 
not subject to human cognition, but can be thought. Thus, freedom is not encountered in the empirical 
realm, or in sensed objects, but is in the realm of the noumenal or things-in-themselves. 
1 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant distinguishes between Wille (will) and Willkiir 
(choice) to characterize two different faculties of the will, the legislative and the 
executive function of volition. Through this distinction, Kant allows finite rational agents 
the freedom to choose maxims based on incentives. However, some Kantian scholars 
believe that Kant did not maintain this distinction in his earlier work. The notion of 
freedom these Kantian scholars refer to suggests the view that only morally good, or 
autonomous, acts are free. Furthermore, this interpretation argues that all immoral, or 
morally bad acts are determined and thus one is not responsible for one's immoral 
actions. Although the distinction between Wille and Willkiir was first made in Kant's later 
moral philosophy I demonstrate that this distinction is implicit in Kant's earlier work. 
Thus, I argue that throughout Kant's moral philosophy, his view is that rational agents 
can freely choose to act for empirical incentives and be held responsible for their 
choices3• 
Section 1: Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy 
I will begin by giving a short overview of Kant's moral philosophy, highlighting 
some of the themes that will be looked at in depth throughout this thesis. To start this 
overview I will introduce how Kant identifies the 'will' in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Kant maintains that the will is the only thing that can be 
considered good without limitation. Kant upholds that the will is good not because of 
3 I ask: Are finite rational agents free when choosing to act against the moral law? Throughout this thesis, I 
will try to answer this question. However, at times I have phrased this question as: Are finite rational 
agents free when acting against the moral law? Whenever I am questioning the freedom of a rational agent 
in this way I understand there to be a maxim on which the action is based. It is not the freedom of the act, 
as acts are determined in time, but the freedom of the agent to choose a maxim. As Mary Gregor states, in 
Laws of Freedom, "it is morally necessary that each of us, as a free agent, be able to express his freedom 
outwardly" (Gregor, 27). Thus acts can express freedom although they are determined in time. 
2 
what it can accomplish, "but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, 
regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be 
brought about by it." (Kant, G 4:394) Reason governs the will, but it does not steer the 
will towards mere empirical incentive. The faculty of reason is not needed to guide one to 
act from empirical incentives. Animals that lack reason react on mere incentives, or 
instincts; thus natural causal laws of nature determine animals to action. However, the 
faculty of reason provides rational agents with a higher purpose other than mere 
gratification or self-preservation. This higher purpose is to achieve a will that is good, 
and a good will is good apart from any other purpose. (Kant, G 4:397) The concept of 
duty is brought forward from this notion of a good will. Rational agents have a duty to 
ensure that their will is driven by reason and that their will is not impacted by mere 
empirical incentives. 
Thus, in order for one to act in a morally good way one must do so from reason 
alone. If one is compelled to act by empirical inclinations or incentives, even when this 
act is the same outward act that reason would dictate, then this act is not done from duty 
and therefore the act is not morally good. In other words, morality "distinguish[ es] 
whether an action in conformity with duty is done from duty or from a self-seeking 
purpose" (Kant, G 4:397) and only those acts that are done from duty are morally good. 
"An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the 
maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon." (Kant, G 4:400) Therefore, a good 
act is done not based on the end it achieves but by the rule acted upon. The rule, or 
subjective principle, that the rational agent acted on is called a maxim. Kant maintains 
that a "duty is the necessity of an action from respect to the law." (Kant, G 4:400) Thus, 
3 
the law must determine the will, without regard to the affective influences on the will. 
The good will, or the law-abiding will, is deprived of all interests that could arise other 
than that of following law. Therefore "nothing is left but the conformity of actions as 
such with a universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought 
never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law." (Kant, G 4:402) This universal law is what maxims must be in 
accordance with and actions must be carried out for the sake of, in order for an action to 
be morally good. Thus, it is not the outward action but is the inward principle that 
determins whether an action is good. 
Because this law, understood by finite beings as a Categorical Imperative, is given 
to each of us through our reason without any reference to the empirical realm, it is a 
universal a priori law. Humans are bound to this law through their duty. However, they 
are only subject to this law through their own lawgiving reason. Thus, to be morally 
good, one "is bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, in 
accordance with nature's end is a will giving universal law." (Kant, G 4:432-3) When 
followed, this principle allows one to be autonomous and any other principle that one 
follows would result in heteronomy4• 
"The principle of autonomy is therefore: to choose only in such a way that the 
maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition." (Kant, G 
4:440) This principle of autonomy is one of the key themes in this thesis, as autonomy is 
none other than the freedom of the will. Therefore, Kant says, "a free will and a will 
4 
"According to Kant's theory of ethics, heteronomy occurs when some object materially determines the 
faculty of choice ( Willkiir), because the [choice] is dependent on a law of nature" (Holzhey, Historical 59). 
4 
under moral laws are one and the same." (Kant, G 4:447)5 The argument that autonomy 
is 'free will' has led Kant scholars to infer that all heteronomous acts are determined by 
empirical conditions. 6 Some Kantian scholars argue that heteronomous acts are not 
determined by the will but by empirical incentives. Therefore, because immoral acts are 
not autonomous, people are determined by their environment to commit such acts. Thus, 
when people act immorally they are determined, like animals, and therefore on Kant's 
account they are relinquish all responsibility for their immoral actions. However, this is a 
misinterpretation of Kant's ethics, for, as we see in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
makes it clear that when one chooses against one's reason, one is unconstrained to do so 7• 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant distinguishes between Wille (will) and Willkur 
(choice) to characterize two different faculties of the will, the legislative and the 
executive functions of volition. However, Kant also at times refers to these two functions 
together as Wille. In allowing the human will freedom to choose maxims, and the 
freedom to choose what to incorporate in maxims, we will see that one can freely choose 
to act on or for incentives. 
Although it might appear as though Kant has struggled somewhat with the role of 
freedom throughout his moral philosophy, I intend to demonstrate that he has not 
wavered on the idea that rational agents can freely choose, through Willkur, to act for 
empirical incentives. Between Kant's publication of the Groundwork, and his 
5 Chapter two address different ways in which this quotation has been interpreted. 
6 Henry Sidgwick, Mike Horenstein, and Emil Fackenheim are examples of Kantian scholars who have 
interpreted Kant in this way. I will be referring to their interpretations of Kant throughout this thesis in 
order to contrast them with my interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. 
7 In the text, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant clearly maintains that finite rational agents 
are free to act on maxims that do not represent the moral law. However, Kant's notion of 'will' which 
explains why or how this is the case is made more explicit in the Metaphysics of Morals. As both of these 
texts supply evidence that rational agents can choose against the moral law, I have chosen to use the 
Metaphysics of Morals as a primary text because the concept of the 'will' is more fully developed. 
5 
publication of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant's definition of which actions are 
performed through one's free will and which actions are performed because one is 
determined by one's environment or natural tendencies appears to have altered 
significantly. Philosophers from Hegel to Bernard Williams have criticized Kant's 
explanation of moral freedom as autonomy. This explanation has been critiqued for 
supposedly requiring people to set aside all of their interests and desires, thus making 
them capable of acting solely from their respect for the moral law. But this consequently 
leads to the predicament of not having anything left to motivate them to act dutifully. 
This interpretation of Kant also commits Kant to the view that only morally good, or 
autonomous, acts are free. Furthermore, this interpretation argues that for Kant all 
immoral, or morally bad acts are determined and thus one is not responsible for one's 
immoral actions. 
Using Henry Allison's discussion of incorporating incentives into maxims, I 
intend to show that for Kant intentional acts, whether they are autonomous or not, are 
free acts. Therefore, for Kant, rational agents are free to incorporate incentives into their 
maxims, and thus they can be held accountable or responsible for all of their intentional 
actions including the ones not in accordance with the moral law. In other words, 
"whenever I act, an incentive can only determine my will to an action insofar as I have 
incorporated that incentive into my maxim. Put differently: a desire, or any other 
incentive, cannot, by itself, move me to act; I have to allow it to move me." (Baron, 
"Henry Allison", 777) 
It would not be difficult to prove that, for Kant, all intentional acts are free if I 
were to restrict my analysis of Kant's work to his later moral philosophy such as Religion 
6 
Within the Limits of Reason Alone, and The Metaphysics of Morals. However, I intend to 
show that there is evidence in What is Enlightenment? the Groundwork and the Critique 
of Practical Reason that rational agents can freely choose to act immorally. Although 
this is not explicit in Kant's earlier texts, it is implicit. 
Thus, to interpret Kant's early moral philosophy as stating that acts which are not 
done for the sake of the moral law are determined and unfree acts, is incorrect. It would 
be absurd for Kant to base his ethics on such a strong division of freedom and 
determinism - a division which results in the view that people are not responsible for 
immoral acts. I am going to use the practical example of suicide to demonstrate why the 
distinction between autonomous acts as free acts, and heteronomous acts as determined 
acts, is practically insufficient and that Kant in fact intended a much different 
interpretation of his earlier work. Throughout this thesis, I will give an interpretation of 
Kant's early moral philosophy that 1) makes it consistent with his later work, 2) does not 
contradict itself with examples such as suicide, and 3) permits holding people responsible 
for immoral actions. 
In order to demonstrate why the distinction between autonomous acts as free acts, 
and heteronomous acts as determined acts is insufficient and inconsistent with Kant's 
view we must first understand where this interpretation comes from. An interpretation 
of Kant's notion of freedom in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is that 
freedom is only possible in acting in accordance with a maxim that represents the moral 
law. As mentioned earlier, Kant says, "a free will and a will under moral law are one and 
the same."(Kant, G 4:447) Therefore, one interpretation is that if one is not acting in 
accordance with the moral law for the sake of the moral law, one is determined and thus 
7 
not free. What determines us when not acting for the sake of the moral law and thus not 
acting from reason alone is the phenomenal realm 8 , or our interests in the phenomenal. 
When not acting from reason, our acts are determined or instinctive, and are thus directed 
towards self-preservation, promotion or conceit. 
In the Groundwork, Kant demonstrates the maxim that the act of suicide is based 
on cannot be in accordance with moral law or laws of nature. Thus, we can neither be 
free nor be determined to commit suicide. Kant gives us different formulations of the 
categorical imperative; the formulation that concerns us is the one that takes the form of 
the natural law. Kant formulate the categorical imperative as, "act as if the maxim of 
your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature." (Kant, G 4:421) 
Kant proceeds from the maxim of suicide to the claim that it is contradictory for suicide 
to be viewed as in accordance with the categorical imperative. For Kant, suicide does not 
pass the universality test; this is because the maxim that the act of suicide is based on 
cannot also hold as a universallaw9 . The act of suicide, or the maxim that the act 
represents, cannot be universally applied because it would be contradictory to do so. 
Kant states the maxim that represents the act of suicide is; "from self-love I make it my 
principle to shorten my life when its longer duration threatens more troubles than it 
8 The phenomenal realm which consists of appearances, or is made up of the noumenon, refers to "things as 
far as they are related to our sensibility; outside this relation they would be unknowable things-in-
themselves ... appearances have empirical reality" (Holzhey, Historical 48). 
9 For my purposes, the universality test is sufficient in demonstrating that the act of suicide goes against 
Kant's categorical imperative. However, there are many valid questions to be raised concerning the 
validity of such a test. Onora O'Neill, in Acting on Principles: An Essay on Kantian Ethics, states; "A 
universality test is a test of principles, and yet is supposed to help us select acts. If principles and acts were 
one-one or one-many correspondence, there would be no problem. We could simply test a principle, and if 
it turned out that it was morally acceptable ... then we would know that any act falling under it would have 
the same moral status," which is what I have done above. However, O'Neill points out that "this is not 
always the case. [She says] not only can a given principle be acted on repeatedly and in various ways, but 
any given act exemplifies numerous principles." (O'Neill, 14) 
8 
promises agreeableness." (Kant, G 4:422) Thus, the contradiction is that the maxim 
serves to end life, while the natural law and the categorical imperative preserves life. 
This being said, there appears to be a problem for Kant. Suicide is not a natural, 
or determined, act because these acts are acts of instincts, which promote self-
preservation. Nor is suicide permitted under the moral law because as we have seen it is 
contradictory to say it is permissible under the moral law. Thus, whether one is acting in 
accordance with the moral law, and therefore is free, or one is acting against the moral 
law, and is therefore determined, suicide is logically excluded as a possible action. If one 
cannot commit suicide freely under the moral law and one cannot commit suicide while 
being determined under the natural law, then how can Kant account for that fact that 
some people commit suicide? Given this understanding of freedom in the Groundwork 
Kant cannot answer this question. It appears as though for Kant, in the Groundwork, we 
are either determined to act (by nature) or free to act (from the moral law), and neither 
nature nor reason permits suicide. However, this supposed problem is easily resolved 
when we consider the practical example of suicide in light of Kant's notion of freedom in 
the Metaphysics of Morals. 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant allows his notion of freedom to include 
choices that do not coincide with the moral law. Kant says "the faculty of desire in 
accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground determining it to action lies within itself 
and not in its object, is called a faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases." 
(Kant, MM 6:213) When the faculty of desire is joined with one's consciousness of the 
ability to bring about the object of desire, a choice is made. Thus, by distinguishing 
between choice (Willkiir) and will (Wille) Kant allows for options that are not done for the 
9 
moral law and are not solely determined by nature. In fact, Kant says that rational agents 
can never be fully determined. From this I infer that rational agents are responsible 
because they have the ability to do otherwise. Kant says "Human choice [Willkiir] ... IS a 
choice that can indeed be affected but is not determined by impulses." (Kant, MM 6:214) 
If I use the example of the act of suicide under this definition of freedom, (i.e. as 
choice) we see that there is indeed a way in which this act can be accounted for. Suicide 
remains irrational, and thus immoral, and still one cannot be determined to commit 
suicide. One can choose to act immorally, however to act immorally or in an evil manner 
is to freely violate the moral law. 
I intend to demonstrate that the notions of freedom found in the Groundwork and 
in the Metaphysics of Morals do not vary as much as they might appear to at first glance. 
I will do this by examining Kant's notion of freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals and 
then refer to his earlier work to see how much of this later view is present. Thus, I will 
look for evidence that Kant is employing the later definition of freedom, which 
incorporates choice, in his earlier work: An Answer to the Question What is 
Enlightenment?, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Critique of 
Practical Reason. 
Section II: Literature 
I intend to demonstrate that throughout Kant's moral philosophy he maintains that 
agents can freely choose to act against the moral law. Actions that represent maxims that 
do not reflect the moral law are immoral, or evil, as well as free. Therefore, finite 
rational agents who do act against the moral law are responsible for these actions, 
10 
because they could have chosen to do otherwise. Kantian scholars rarely dispute this 
thesis when it is in relation to Kant's later moral philosophy. However, Mike Horenstein, 
in "The Question Concerning Freedom in Kantian Moral Philosophy" claims, "Kant's so-
called theory of freedom is indeed, in spite of Kant, virtually a theory of determinism." 
(Horenstein, 146) My argument is not directed towards refuting this claim 10 . Horenstein 
states that Kant's philosophy leads to the conclusion that "Our acts are the expression and 
inevitable result of our being ... We actually do what we must do, what we cannot help 
doing." (Horenstein, 146) Horenstein does not believe that Kant has found a bridge 
between the noumenal self and the phenoumenal self; therefore, regardless of any 
noumenal input all acts are pre-determined regardless of one's awareness of the moral 
law. 
My argument is directed towards the scholars who interpret Kant as claiming that 
only maxims that represent the moral law are free, while immoral maxims and acts are 
not free. My argument is also directed towards scholars who believe Kant had changed 
his mind on this topic. Emil Fackenheim, in "Kant and Radical Evil", claims that Kant 
changed his view regarding which acts are a result of one's being free to choose. 
Fackenheim states, 
According to Kant, whatever is not will towards good, is not free will 
at all. This means that his moral failure is due to the domination of 
inclination, pure and simple, and will does not enter into it. It follows, 
therefore, that the villain is not a villain at all, but an innocent 
weakling. And he deserves, not our censure, but our pity ... Kant 
comes to reject this view. Man, to be genuinely free and responsible, 
must have the choice, not between willing the good or not willing at 
all, but between good and evil. It must be possible for him to choose 
10 My argument presupposes that finite rational agents are at the very least free when acting for the sake of 
the moral law. Therefore, the question I ask is not "am I free?" but am I free to choose maxims that are not 
for the sake of the moral law. 
11 
freely, i.e. responsibly, and yet choose against the moral law. 
(Fackenheim, 265) 
Thus, Fackenheim believes that Kant had changed his notion of freedom over time. 
Fackenheim argues that Kant's early philosophy cannot account for holding people 
responsible for their immoral acts. This is because, if one commits an immoral act, one 
was dominated or determined by inclinations and thus one could not have chosen to do 
otherwise. In Chapter II I will argue that this is an unfair interpretation of Kant. 
Also into this camp of Kantian critics falls Henry Sidgwick. Sidgwick makes a 
slightly different claim than Fackenheim. Sidgwick believes that both of the different 
notions of freedom, presented in the quote above, are found in Kant's Groundwork. In an 
appendix titled "The Kantian Conception of Free Will" found in Methods of Ethics, 
Sidgwick's aim "is to show that, in different parts of Kant's exposition ofhis doctrine, 
two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same word freedom; while yet 
Kant does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the meaning of the term." 
(Sidgwick) The notions of freedom that Sidgwick highlights are the same ideas that 
Fackenheim has given above. Sidgwick maintains that for Kant, freedom sometimes 
means that man is free only in so far as he acts in accordance with reason, and at other 
times, freedom is viewed as inherent in choosing between good and evil. Sidgwick 
claims that these two notions of freedom are incompatible. 
Not only do I think that these philosophers, have misinterpreted Kant's early 
moral philosophy, but I also find their conclusion involving moral responsibility 
unsettling 11 . Therefore, I will turn my attention towards work of Martin Van Hees, 
11 Horenstein's, Fackenheim's, and Sidgwick's views regarding responsibility are made explicit in the 
conclusion to this thesis. 
12 
Gunner Beck, and George Schrader where we will see that their interpretations of Kant's 
notion of freedom, remains consistent throughout the whole of Kant's moral philosophy. 
Martin Van Hees, in his article titled "Acting Autonomously Versus Not Acting 
Heteronomously" synthesizes what Sidgwick considers to comprise two 'incompatible 
meanings' of freedom. Van Hees claims all adult rational agents are autonomous; 
however, the ability to express autonomy varies between individuals. Thus, all rational 
adult beings have rational freedom of choice regardless of whether they act on maxims 
that represent the moral law or maxims that do not represent the moral law. Although 
Van Hees' notion of freedom off Willkur can be consistently applied throughout Kant's 
moral philosophy, I believe Mary Gregor, in Laws of Freedom, has an explanation that is 
more consistent with Kant's philosophy. Gunnar Beck, in Autonomy, History and 
Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy, summarizes Gregor's position nicely 
when he says, "Men can be autonomous only if they choose to be so, and this means that 
more than one course of action must be open to them. They, therefore, must be free in 
the external sense, free from constraint by others and free to choose between ends that are 
moral and those that are not." (Beck, G., 218) Gregor's notion of freedom is similar to 
the notion of freedom that I will be working with throughout this thesis. 
George Schrader in "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral Imperatives" 
demonstrates another way in which this notion of freedom can be portrayed. Schrader 
states, "Man cannot escape the moral law because he cannot escape his own rationality. 
Man's reason makes an inexorable demand upon him at all times, which make him 
morally responsible no matter what he may do." (Schrader, 71) This is precisely the 
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notion of freedom and responsibility that I interpret Kant to be asserting throughout his 
moral philosophy. 
A section of my argument will closely coincide with Henry Allison's and John 
Silber's work on Kant's theory of freedom. Allison 12 gives us what he refers to as the 
"Incorporation Thesis." 13 Kant states, "freedom of the will [Willkiir] is of a wholly 
unique nature in that an incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the 
individual has incorporated it into his maxim." (Kant, 1998, 39-40, Allison, 1990, 24) 
Thus, Allison's Incorporation Thesis claims that empirical incentives cannot determine a 
will without the rational agent freely choosing the incentive to insert into a maxim. 
Allison's discussion of the Incorporation Thesis addresses the distinction Kant makes in 
The Metaphysics of Morals between Wille and Willkiir (choice), as I have alluded to 
earlier. This distinction is key to demonstrating that the Incorporation Thesis is what 
Kant has in mind during his later moral works. I will be following Allison to the 
Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, in search of evidence that Kant 
maintained that finite rational agents are free to choose against the moral law. I will 
extend Allison's arguments by supporting and developing his ideas particularly by 
looking at practical examples given by Kant. I will also discuss why it is that Allison and 
12 This thesis presupposes Kant's description of transcendental idealism. As Allison says, the 
"transcendental distinction is not primarily between two kinds of entity, appearances and things in 
themselves, but rather between two distinct ways in which the objects of human experience may be 
'considered' in philosophical reflection, namely, as they appear and as they are." (Allison, 1990, 3-4) This 
presupposition will allow some of the problems surrounding the noumenal-phenomenal distinction to be 
side stepped. 
13 However, through taking this approach I will have to pay particular attention to the fact that spontaneity, 
which is the kind of freedom that allows for the Incorporation Theory can be thought but not experienced. 
As Kant's transcendental idealism tells us, spontaneity is "merely intelligible." Thus, as Allison 
says,"[spontaneity does not] enter into an empirical account or explanation of human action." (Allison, 
1990, 5) 
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I disagree on the status of habitual actions and demonstrate that Allison needs to expand 
his Incorporation Thesis in order to include habitual acts. 
Section III: Overview of the Thesis Chapters 
Chapter one of this tesis focuses on The Metaphysics of Morals. I start with 
Kant's later moral philosophy so that we can get a clear picture of what it is we are 
looking for in Kant's earlier work. Chapter I starts with a discussion of duty to the moral 
law, or what one ought to do. My reason for starting this way is so that we do not lose 
sight of the underlying principles of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole. Some Kant 
scholars believe that it undermines Kant's moral theory to suggest that actions which are 
based on maxims, which do not in represent the moral law are free actions. However, I 
want to make it clear from the start that this is not my intention, nor is it my conclusion. 
Thus, I start with a fundamental aspect of Kant's moral philosophy, this being the 
question of 'ought' or duty. This concept will be shown to be consistent throughout 
Kant's moral theory. Next, I discuss Kant's explanation of a finite rational agent's will, 
and the distinction that Kant makes between Wille and Willkur. This distinction is a 
central theme of this thesis. However, prior to the Metaphysics of Morals Kant does not 
explicitly make this distinction. This distinction shows how it is that rational agents can 
freely act on maxims that do not represent the moral law. The final section of this chapter 
deals predominantly with Kant's notion of freedom as it is presented in The Metaphysics 
of Morals. 
In the second Chapter, I examine Kant's texts An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? and the Groundwork/or the Metaphysics of Morals. In these earlier 
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works, Kant does not use the terms Wille and Willkiir. However, I demonstrate that this 
distinction is implicit in Kant's early moral philosophy. 
This chapter starts with a discussion on moral responsibility. As seen in the 
suicide example, if one is determined to commit a certain act then one is not responsible 
for this act, as it was out of one's control. Therefore, I look for evidence in Kant's earlier 
moral philosophy that according to Kant, individuals can be held responsible for their 
acts even when those acts are not in accordance with the moral law. This will show that 
for Kant finite rational beings can freely choose to act on a maxim which is not in 
accordance with the moral law. The discussion on responsibility leads into a discussion 
on the decision-making processes within Kant's moral philosophy. In this section, we 
will see that, for Kant, finite rational agents decide what incentives to include in their 
potential maxims and then are able to freely decide which maxim wi11 form the 
determining ground of their action. In section three of this chapter, I address duties and 
responsibilities. I demonstrate that if one has the ability to choose to act on a maxim that 
is in accordance with the moral law then one also has the ability to choose not to act on a 
maxim that is in accordance with the moral law. In the final section, 'habit' is addressed 
in order to emphasize the responsibility that finite rational agents have for all their acts 
regardless of the acts' relationship to the moral law. 
In Chapter III, I address Kant's second Critique, the Critique of Pure Practical 
Reason. Section I of this chapter examines how reason gives the moral law as the 
determining ground of the will independent from sensible conditions, which leads to the 
notion of freedom. This section looks at two examples in Kant's text often referred to as 
the 'gallows examples.' These examples demonstrate Kant's view that finite rational 
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beings are not determined to act by empirical incentives. The next section in this chapter 
addresses incentives. We shall see that finite rational beings can choose to incorporate 
empirical and moral incentives into their maxims. In both of these instances, the 
incentives are freely incorporated into the maxims on which their actions are based. 
The final section of this chapter demonstrates in what sense 'rational agents acting 
against the moral law' are free and in what sense they are not. In a section of the second 
Critique titled the 'Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,' Kant discusses 
rational agent's freedom with reference to the noumenal self and the phenomenal self. 
Every rational agent is both noumenal and phenomenal. The phenomenal self, whether it 
is good or evil, is always determined in time. The noumenal self is always free to 
formulate potential maxims and include incentives of any kind into these maxims. Thus, 
the noumenal self is always free to decide on which maxims to base its actions, even 
when these are not maxims in line with the moral law. 
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Introduction 
Chapter I 
Wille and Willkiir 
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant gives an in-depth analysis of his notion of 
freedom. This notion of freedom includes a distinction between Wille and Willkiir, which 
is found primarily in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, and in the Doctrine 
ofVirtue 1• Kant's earlier notion of freedom, found in the Groundwork and in the Second 
Critique, does not explicitly state the distinction between Wille and Willkiir. The purpose 
of this chapter is to expound on the notion of freedom found in the Metaphysics of 
Morals highlighting the distinction between Wille and Willkiir. The following chapters 
will demonstrate that although this distinction was not made explicit until the 
Metaphysics of Morals, it is implicit in Kant's earlier moral philosophy making it clear 
that finite 'rational' agents can choose to act immorally. 
In Section I of this chapter, I begin by discussing duty and obligation. Kant 
claims that one is most free when acting for the sake of duty that a free rational agent has 
to oneself. However, this does not exclude an element of freedom when one acts against 
duty in other words, one is still free when acting against one's duty. 
Section II gives an explanation of Kant's notion ofthe will. For Kant the will has 
two main functions: Wille has a legislating function while Willkiir makes choices. I will 
address the distinction and relationship between Wille and Willkiir. Willkiir is 
particularly important because it gives insight into a rational agent's ability to freely 
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choose maxims and incentives. Thus while finite rational agents are legislated by both 
reason and nature they are determined by neither. 
Finally, in Section III, I will demonstrate how the concepts of duty, Wille, and 
Willkiir are reflected in Kant's notion of freedom. As we will see in Section I duty is 
intertwined with inner freedom, and in Section II positive and negative freedom will be 
related to Wille and Willkiir. Section III ties all of these concepts together to discuss 
Kant's notion of freedom. This section addresses how it is that rational agents become 
aware of their freedom, and in what sense they can 'act' freely. Through this discussion, 
we come to see that on Kant's moral theory rational agents freely choose to act for or 
against the moral law. In that rational agents can chose to act immorally, they are 
therefore responsible for such actions. 
Section I: Duty and Obligation 
The Metaphysics of Morals is divided into two sections, the Doctrine of Right and 
the Doctrine of Virtue; however these two sections together could be called the Doctrine 
of Duty, because both sections deal with the concepts of obligation and duty. Kant states, 
"Obligation is the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason," 
(Kant, MM 6:222) and an imperative is a practical rule through which an action is made 
necessary2. As Kant further explains, 
An imperative is a rule the representation of which makes necessary an 
action that is subjectively contingent and thus represents the subject as 
one that must be constrained (necessitated) to conform a rule.- A 
1 The Metaphysics of Morals is divided into two sections, the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. 
I will discuss the relationship between these two Doctrines and show how the distinction is related to the 
discussion on freedom in the first section of this chapter, titled Duty and Obligation. 
2 Chapter III will give an in depth discussion on imperatives which includes hypothetical imperatives. 
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categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that represents an action 
as objectively necessary. (Kant, MM 6:222) 
The categorical imperative represents objectively necessary actions, and thus it legislates 
moral duty. George Schrader deals extensively with the concept of duty in his paper 
titled "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral Imperatives" where he demonstrates the 
relevance of duty to Kant's moral philosophy. Schrader maintains that the ground of the 
possibility of the categorical imperative is found in the subject's ability to choose freely, 
hence, the possibility to ground a categorical imperative is in one's freedom of choice3 
(Schrader, 66). Without being able to choose freely one would be an animal, determined 
by natural incentives4 . However, through a rational agent's ability, to choose, or through 
the recognition of choices5 , one is able to become aware of the categorical imperative. 
"Duty is that action to which someone is bound. It is therefore the matter of 
obligation, and there can be one and the same duty (as to the action) although we can be 
bound to it in different ways." (Kant, MM 6:222) For instance, the categorical imperative 
both commands and prohibits, hence it is a moral practical law. An action that is neither 
commanded nor prohibited is merely permitted, "since there is no law limiting one's 
3 As we will see in the following chapters Kant is unclear as to whether rational agents are aware of the 
moral law by knowing that they are free, or whether they know they are free by first being aware of the 
moral law. In section three of the Groundwork Kant states, "All human beings think of themselves as 
having a free will. From this come all judgments upon actions as beings such that they ought to have been 
done even though they were not done. " (Kant, G 4:445) whereas in the second Critique Kant states, "moral 
law is the condition under which we first become aware of freedom." (Kant, CPracR 5:4) However, overall 
Kant maintains that freedom and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. Kant says, "had not the moral law 
already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming 
such a thing as freedom ... But were there no freedom, the moral law would not be encountered at all in 
ourselves." (Kant, CPracR 5:5) 
4 In fact, for Kant, purely rational beings do not have the freedom to make moral decisions either, as they 
only have reason, thus leaving them with nothing to choose between. In other words, a purely rational 
being (Kant uses the example of an Angel) does not interact with the phenomenal realm and thus pure 
reason guides without interference. 
5 In Chapter two there is an extensive discussion of perfect and imperfect duties. In this discussion, it will 
become evident that even within morally good decisions there are choices to be made between maxims. 
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freedom (one's authorization) with regard to it and so too no duty. Such an action is 
called morally indifferent." (Kant, MM 6:223) An action that is done for the moral law 
and thus is necessitated by the moral law is a morally good action. Maxims that are 
prohibited by the moral law are evil actions. 
Given the criteria for obligation and duty, it is impossible for duties to conflict. 
The concepts of duty and obligation are expressed as objectively practical and necessary, 
hence opposing rules cannot be both necessary at the same time. (Kant, MM 6:224) A 
practical rule, or imperative, differs from a practical law in that an action represented by 
the law may or may not inhere to an inner necessity. For example, if the acting subject is 
holy, and thus always rational and never contingent, then there is no imperative needed to 
act, because the law dictates without interference. 
"A principle that makes certain actions duties is a practical law. A rule that the 
agent himself makes his principle on subjective grounds is called his maxim; hence 
different agents can have very different maxims with regard to the same law." (Kant, MM 
6:225) An example of a practical law which represents the categorical imperative is, 'do 
not lie.' Maxims that follow this practical law are 'tell the truth' or the maxim 'to abstain 
from answering when one does not wish to tell the truth'. Therefore, if a threatening 
person comes to the door asking for someone, who you know to be upstairs, you may tell 
him or her that you refuse to tell where the person he or she is seeking is. However, if a 
different person were to answer the door he or she may tell the threatening person that the 
person he or she is seeking is upstairs. Regardless of the reply given to the threatening 
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person, both replies follow the practical rule 'not to lie'. An alternative reply would be to 
lie; however, this reply does not follow the practical rule 'not to lie'. 6 
There are two different types of duties, which follow from different types of laws. 
"All duties are either duties of right (official iuris), that is, duties for which external 
lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (official virtutis s. ethica), for which external 
lawgiving is not possible." (Kant, MM 6:239) External law giving is not possible for 
duties of virtue because the end for which duties of virtue must be pursued is the end one 
sets for oneself internally. External law prescribes external action that would lead to an 
end; however such prescription could not lead subjects to set an end as their own end. 
The Doctrine of Virtue identifies inner duties of freedom, rather than outer duties, 
under law. (Kant, MM 6:380) Kant refers to this inner law as the moral law and only 
inner duties are ethica17 . Inner duties are legislated through the moral law, and must be 
carried out for the sake of the moral law in order to be fulfilled. Examples of inner duties 
are 'do not lie' and 'do not cheat.' It is not possible to discern if another has fulfilled an 
inner duty because the action cannot relay whether the duty was carried out for the sake 
of the moral law or for some other reason. External laws, or duties, may include 'do not 
cheat by taking performance enhancing drugs at the Olympics' and 'do not lie while 
6 Onora O'Neill, in Acting On Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics, tells us what a maxim is but she also 
highlights that rational agents are free when their acts are based on maxims that they choose. O'Neill 
states, "A maxim is a principle which, in Kant's terminology, expresses a determination of the power of 
choice. To say that an agent's power of choice is determined is simply to say that he intends to do a 
specific sort of act or purse a specific end in some situation. If an agent has a maxim "To do A ifB," then 
he intends to do A if B." (O'Neill, 40) 
7 Kant states, "In ancient times "ethics" signified the doctrine of morals (philosophia mora/is) in general, 
which was also called the doctrine of duties. Later on it seemed better to reserve the name "ethics" for one 
part of moral philosophy, namely for the doctrine of those duties that do not come under external laws (it 
was thought appropriate to call this, in German, the doctrine of virtue). Accordingly, the system of the 
doctrine of duties in general is now divided into the system of the doctrine of right (ius), which deals with 
duties that can be given by external laws, and the system of the doctrine of virtue (Ethica), which treats of 
duties that cannot be so given; and this division may stand." (Kant, MM 6:379) 
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testifying in court'. One can verify whether an individual has followed an external law or 
fulfilled one's external duty8• 
Our duty to the inner law, or the moral law, will always only be imperfect because 
the moral law does not give laws for action, but only for maxims. Thus, the moral law 
leaves room for free choice. Kant says, imperfect laws "cannot specify precisely in what 
way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end that is also a duty." 
(Kant, MM 6:390) Imperfect laws are in contrast to perfect laws, or judicial laws, which 
are found in The Doctrine of Right; these laws are explicit in the actions one must 
perform or may not perform. 
Through the moral law we create ends which are also duties, thus to act morally 
we "act in accordance with duty from duty." In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant defines inner 
duty, or duties of virtue as wide duties. These duties are wide because there is no action 
that is prescribed by the moral law, only a law to which the maxim of an action must be 
in accordance. Thus, there is a wide range of actions that are in accordance with the 
moral law. Kant divides these wide duties of virtue into two categories, One's own 
perfection as an end that is also a duty and the happiness of others as an end that is also 
a duty. These are duties ofvirtue because, Kant says, "Virtue is the strength of a human 
being's maxims in fulfilling his duty. - Strength of any kind can be recognized only by 
the obstacles it can overcome". (Kant, MM 6:394) For virtue, these obstacles are natural 
inclinations. 
This 'strength' is an inner strength, because it comes from within oneself by 
resisting empirical incentives in order to act for the sake of the moral law. Furthermore, 
the moral law is formulated and legislated by each rational agent to him or herself, 
8 External duty is seen again in Chapter II, Section II titled 'Duty', with regards to a soldier example. 
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whereas, the type of law discussed in the Doctrine of Right is externally legislated to 
rational agents. As stated in the Introduction, the supreme (moral) principle is to "act in 
accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have." 
(Kant, MM 6:395) This law cannot be verified, but is instead deduced from pure 
practical reason. To be virtuous, and thus strong, one must exercise self-constraint, 
which is initiated through pure practical reason. 
Human beings, [are] rational natural beings, who are unholy enough 
that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though 
they recognize its authority ... But since the human being is still a free 
(moral) being, when the concept of duty concerns the internal 
determination ofhis will (the incentive) the constraint that the concept 
of duty contains can be only self constraint ... for only so can that 
necessitation . .. be united with the freedom of his choice. (Kant, MM 
6:380) 
Virtue is its own end, its own reward. Therefore, "Virtue is, the moral strength of a 
human being's will in fulfilling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving 
reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority executing the law." (Kant, MM 6:405) 
And only when one possesses courage9 or practical wisdom can one be free from 
empirical incentives. 
In the moral imperative and the presupposition of freedom that is 
necessary for it, are found the law, the capacity (to fulfill the law), and 
the will determining the maxim ... [for duty of right] But in the 
imperative that prescribes a duty of virtue there is added not only the 
concept of self-constraint but that of an end, not an end that we have 
but one that we ought to have, one that pure practical reason therefore 
has within us. (Kant, MM 6:396) 
9 This reference to courage will tie into to a later discussion regarding An Answer to the Question; What is 
Enlightenment. 
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To be virtuous one cannot be passive; virtue requires action for the sake of the 
morallaw 10 . "Virtue cannot be defined as an aptitude for free actions in conformity with 
law unless there is added "to determine oneself to act through the thought of law," and 
then this aptitude is not a property of choice but of the will, which is a faculty of desire 
that, in adopting a rule, also gives it as a universal law." (Kant, MM 6:407) 
Inner freedom is obtained as a result of acting for the sake of the moral law, or 
fulfilling one's duties of virtue. Inner freedom is indistinguishable from the type of 
freedom obtained through acting autonomously. Kant says there are two things required 
in order to maintain inner freedom 11 • First, one must be one's own master, and second 
one must rule oneself. In other words, "Subduing one's affects and governing one's 
passions. [And only] in these two states is one's character noble; in the opposite case it is 
mean." (Kant, MM 6:407) Virtue is based in one's inner freedom to bring all of one's 
'capacities and inclinations' (such as feelings, passions, and affections) under the faculty 
of reason so that reason is in total control. Kant states, "For unless reason holds the reins 
of government in its own hands, feelings and inclination play the master over him." 
(Kant, MM 6:408) For Kant, true evil are the visas that get in the way of reason and our 
ability to control these vices. An example of true evil is to steal even when one 
recognizes that one ought not to. 
10 In other words, if virtuous acts are performed out ofhabit they are no longer virtuous. Habitual acts 
become a (thoughtless) necessity and thus one is not free when engaging in a habit. There is an in-depth 
discussion concerning habit in Chapter II of this thesis. 
11 See the thesis Introduction for further discussion on autonomy. Kant also has a notion of outer or 
external freedom in the Doctrine of Duty. However, external freedom is outside the scope of this thesis as I 
would argue that the distinction between Wille and Willkilr is what allows for external freedom. Therefore 
external freedom need not be discussed in order to understand Wille and Willkiir or how it is one can be 
held responsible for their immoral actions. 
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Above, we have seen that finite rational agents have a duty to the moral law, 
which they ought to abide by. Furthermore, we have seen what one must do in order to 
maximize one's inner freedom. Through this discussion it has become apparent that, for 
Kant finite rational beings can act in such a way that their actions are not done for the 
sake of moral duty or that their maxims may not lead to the full potential of their inner 
freedom. The following section examines the type of will that finite rational agents must 
have in order both to be subject to a law which they give to themselves through their 
reason and still choose to act against such law. Therefore, I will address what one must 
have in order to be able to gain inner freedom. We will see that inner freedom is possible 
through possessing a particular type of will. 
Section II: Wille and Willkiir 
The duty one has to the moral law dictates that one's maxims for action ought to 
be done for the sake of the moral law and in accordance with the moral law. However, as 
mentioned above, the moral law does not dictate what specific actions ought to be taken. 
The duty one has to the moral law is a wide duty; hence, there is room for free choice in 
internal law giving. As Schrader states in "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral 
Imperatives," the possibility for an internal law, such as the categorical imperative, is 
grounded in one's freedom of choice and without this "categorical imperative there 
would be, on Kant's view, no such thing as morality." (Schrader, 66) A finite rational 
agent's will allow him or her to give oneself the moral law as well as to formulate and 
choose maxims on which to base one's actions. The will is made up of two components, 
Wille and Willkiir. Prior to the Metaphysics of Morals Kant had not defined Wille and 
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Willkiir; although Kant uses these terms in the Critique of Practical Reason as well as in 
the Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Henry Allison in Kant's Theory of 
Freedom, explains Kant's reason for this distinction: "Kant is attempting to move from a 
general account ofthe faculty of desire to an analysis ofhuman volition." (Allison, 
Kant's Theory, 130) 
Kant gives the distinction between Wille and Willkiir in the introduction to the 
Metaphysics ofMorals. Kant states, 
Laws proceed from the will [Wille], maxims from choice [Willkiir]. In 
man the latter is free choice; the will [Wille], which is directed to 
nothing beyond the law itself, cannot be called either free or unfree, 
since it is not directed to actions but immediately to giving laws for the 
maxims of actions (and is, therefore, practical reason itself). Hence 
the will directs with absolute necessity and is itself subject to no 
necessitation. Only choice [Willkiir] can therefore be called free. 
(Kant, MM 6:226) 
I will draw upon both John Silber's and Allison's explanation of Wille and 
Willkiir to explain Kant's concept of the will. Silber notes that Willkiir is the 'radical 
capacity for free choice', while Wille refers purely to the rational concept of the will. 
Silber states, "Wille is as much a part of the will as Willkiir, for without it there could be 
no rational structure for freedom, no experience of obligation, and hence no awareness of 
the power of volition." (Silber, "The Copernican Revolution" civ) However, Silber does 
maintain that "Wille does not make decisions, or adopt maxims; it does not act. Rather it 
is the source of a strong and ever present incentive in Willkiir, and, if strong enough to be 
adopted by Willkiir into the maxim of its choice, Wille "can determine the Willkiir [and 
then] it is practical reason itself." (Silber, "The Copernican Revolution" civ) Thus, 
practical reason is executed and followed when Wille determines Willkiir. Allison calls 
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this situation, or practical reason itself, Wille in the broad sense, whereas Silber calls this 
the 'will'. 
Nonetheless, Allison has a similar interpretation to Silber's of Kant's notion of 
Wille and Willkiir. Allison points out that Kant has two uses for the term Wille. One use 
of the term Wille is narrow and the other is broad. The narrow way in which Kant uses 
Wille is defined in the passage above. Wille has a legislative function, which is equated 
to practical reason. "Wille is the source of the laws that confront the human Willkiir as 
imperatives ... [ Willkiir has the executive power] to act, that is to decide, choose, and 
even wish under the governance of Wille." (Allison, "Kant's Theory" 130) Thus, laws 
come from the narrow Wille, while maxims from Willkiir. Wille provides the norm by 
which Willkiir chooses. Wille is determining and not determined; however, Kant is clear 
when he tells us Wille is not free. Wille is not free because it "relates to nothing but the 
law ... [Therefore, it] can be termed neither free nor unfree. The reason for this is simply 
that it is not concerned with actions but with the legislation for the maxims of actions." 
(Allison, "Kant's Theory" 131) Wille in the narrow sense is not autonomous, although it 
is law giving. Wille gives law to the Willkiir, not to itself. However, in the broad sense 
of Wille, it is autonomous. The broad sense in which Kant uses Wille is to represent the 
will as one faculty containing both the narrow sense of Wille and Willkiir. Thus, the 
broad Wille is law giving to itself. 
When looking back at the previous section on duty and obligation, we can see 
how both aspects of the (broad) Wille are present in decision-making. The (narrow) Wille 
gives rational finite beings the practical law, which they ought to follow, while Willkiir 
freely allows people to choose their maxims on which to act. Finite rational beings can 
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freely choose their maxims, which may or may not be in accordance with the moral law. 
Thus, rational finite beings can freely choose a maxim to act on which does not represent 
the moral law. However, Kant maintains that rational finite beings are most free when 
they act on maxims for the moral law because the moral law is a law that rational beings 
give themselves. Thus acting virtuously, or fully autonomously, gives rational agents the 
maximal amount of inner freedom they can have. 
Ronald Perrin, in "Freedom and the World: The Unresolved Dilemma of Kant's 
Ethics", addresses why it is that, for Kant, the will cannot be merely legislative, and 
instead Kant must describe the will as free. Perrin says, "The moral law signals a 
movement whereby the will transcends the phenomenal realm towards the noumenal. 
[Kant] can justifY this movement only if he maintains that despite the influences exerted 
upon it by virtue of its phenomenal character the will is in some sense free." (Perrin, 
"Freedom and the World" D-3) Perrin describes this problem in terms of a paradox: 'the 
will, or a person as a willful being, must be free in order to become free.' 
Perrin disapproves of the description of Wille and Willkiir given by Silber, and, by 
implication, that given by Allison. Perrin disagrees with these interpretations for two key 
reasons. Perrin states, 
Through ascribing the activity of freedom only to Willkiir Silber 
jeopardizes his earlier contention that Wille and Willkiir are two 
elements of the same faculty ... [and] what is more Silber's claim 
contradicts Kant's contention that Wille is autonomous and that this 
autonomy expresses the capacity of pure reason to determine the 
activity of the heteronomous will in accordance with the moral law." 
(Perrin, "Freedom and he World" D-4) 
Perrin's first criticism of Silber's account of Wille and Willkiir is that it makes the 
will or practical reason (or for Allison, the broad Wille) both free and not free. This 
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criticism can be avoided by not identifying Wille and Willkiir as two elements of the same 
faculty (like mind and body) but through recognizing them as two complementary effects 
of one faculty that can only theoretically be discussed as separate and never practically 
used independent of the other. Instead of using an analogy like two sides of a coin, think 
of Wille and Willkiir as colours like red and blue that together make purple. It is not 
possible, given a bucket of purple paint, to paint one wall red and the other blue; 
however, it may be useful to discuss the paint in terms of these separate colours 12• Silber, 
as Kant does, employs a technique of making a distinction within the will for theoretical 
reasons or explanation. Through recognizing that Kant uses the term 'will' in both a 
broad and a narrow sense Silber and Allison's accounts of Wille are completely defended 
from this criticism. 
Perrin, on the other hand, has a very dualistic concept of the will. He claims 
that this arises from Kant's definition of autonomy. Kant maintains that, the pure will is 
negatively free from material determination, and that it is positively free to determine 
itself formally. I call Perrin's account dualistic because he maintains that there are "two 
moments of freedom and two corresponding aspects of the will. The negative moment of 
freedom expresses the capacity of Willkiir to transcend the determinations of the 
phenomenal world and the potential of its maxims to assume a universal and legislative 
form." (Perrin, "Freedom and the World" D-5) However, using Allison's technique of 
'looking' at things, as they are and as they appear, we can see that although Perrin is 
12 Allison says, with respect to transcendental idealism that the "transcendental distinction is not primarily 
between two kinds of entities, appearances and things in themselves, but rather between two distinct ways 
in which the objects ofhuman experience may be 'considered' in philosophical reflection, namely, as they 
appear and as they are." (Allison, Kant's Theory 3-4) This same technique, of making distinctions for 
theoretical purposes is how Kant is discussing the will. 
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correct about the aspects of the will, he must reconsider his discussion on the moments of 
freedom. To clear up this discrepancy we can tum to Kant's text to find the determining 
ground of Willkiir, or choice. 
Kant says, "the faculty of desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the 
ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty to 
do or to refrain from doing as one pleases." (Kant, MM6:213) When the faculty of 
desire is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about the object of desire, 
this action is called choice or Willkiir. If this consciousness is not present then this action 
is called wish. The inner determining ground for the faculty of desire lies within the 
subject's reason, and is called the will or Wille. Thus, Wille is not in relation to action 
except through Willkiir (choice). Wille is practical reason itself and therefore has no 
determining ground; hence Wille is what grounds both Willkiir and wish. (Kant, MM 
6:213) A choice that is determined by pure reason is a free choice, while that which is 
determined by inclination is an animal choice and thus heteronomous. However, as Kant 
says, "Human choice . . . is a choice that can indeed be affected but is not determined by 
impulses, and is therefore of itself ... not pure but can still be determined to action by 
pure will. Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible 
impulses." (Kant, MM6:214) Silber explains this by stating, "The determination of 
Willkiir by Wille can occur in varying degrees, with the general provision that nothing 
determines Willkiir unless Willkiir chooses to be so determined." (Silber, "The 
Copernican Revolution" cv) As Allison explains, "freedom of Willkiir is practical 
spontaneity; even in acting on impulse, it is not causally determined by that impulse." 
(Allison, Kant's Theory 132) Thus, the negative concept of freedom of the Willkiir is 
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freedom from being determined by sensuous things, while the positive notion of freedom 
of the Willkiir is that pure reason itself can be practical. What distinguishes the moral 
law from natural laws is that the moral law is a law of freedom, and thus the moral law is 
the determining ground for ethical action. 
The moral law provides an end, to which free choice can and must orientate itself, 
if the free choice is to be a duty of virtue. (Kant, MM 6:383) The moral law is given to 
the selfby the self; hence the end that is provided by the moral law is also given to the 
self by the self. Therefore, as Kant says "I can have no end without making it an end for 
myself. To have an end that I have not myself made an end is self-contradictory, an act 
of freedom which is yet not free." (Kant, MM 6:382) Thus, even if the end for which an 
act is performed is an empirical incentive it is still an end one gives oneself, and thus the 
act is free. Therefore, whether or not the act is done for the moral law, it is done from 
free choice. Thus, ethics provides matter, or an end (of pure reason), which is the object 
of free choice. Kant remarks, "The less a human being can be constrained by natural 
means and the more he can be constrained morally (through the mere representation of 
duty), so much the more he is free." (Kant, MM 6:385) 
Thus according to Kant one is most free when one is acting for the moral law 
which one gives to oneself and one has a lesser degree of freedom when one is acting 
against the moral law. This may appear to be problematic for Kant as it is difficult to 
consider the notion of freedom in terms of degrees, or as a continuum, and not as an 
absolute. It may be thought that the only possibilities surrounding freedom is either that 
one is free or that one is not free, or determined. 
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However, one can show that Kant's moral philosophy involves rational agents 
having degrees of freedom. For example, in What is Enlightenment, Kant's distinction 
between the public and private use of reason gives us a model for understanding how a 
rational agent can have a lesser degree of freedom when acting immorally rather than 
morally. Kant says "the public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can 
bring about enlightenment among human beings ... [and] by the public use of one's own 
reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire 
public of the world of readers." (Kant, AQWE 8:37) When one exercises their public use 
of reason they are acting in a morally good way and thus from and for the sake of the 
moral law. Kant says, "the private use of one's reason may, however, often be very 
narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment ... 
What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a civil post or 
office with which he is entrusted." (Kant, AQWE 8:37) I will illustrate this point by using 
one of the same examples as Kant does which is an officer of the state. Kant maintains 
that an officer must act passively and obey orders while on duty, as it is impermissible to 
argue or question a superior. However, when the officer is off duty he must exercise his 
public use of reason and cannot be restricted from criticizing the military and put these 
criticisms forward to the public. 
From this example, we can see that the officer has a greater degree of freedom 
when not on duty. The increase in the amount of freedom is in a sense granted by society 
or the government it is as if a restriction on him is lifted. However, the officer's degree 
of freedom only actuallly increases if he exercises his reason to act from and for the sake 
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of the moral law when given the opportunity. In this case, the soldier can choose not to 
exercise a greater degree of freedom although the opportunity presents itself. 
This example shows how it is that a rational agent acting against the moral law is 
less free then a rational agent acting from the moral law. In a sense the immoral agent is 
like the on duty officer who has the ability to lift restrictions off himself. All rational 
agents are self-governing, in that they all possess the moral law and either choose to act 
for the sake of the law or not. When a rational agent chooses to act for the sake of the 
moral law they increase their amount of freedom in the way of the off-duty officer could. 
Thus, What is Enlightenment shows us that enlightenment is a process that one 
undergoes. Finite rational agents are in a state of self-incurred minority, which has a 
lesser degree of freedom, until they decide to exercise their freedom more robustly and 
begin the process of entering a state of majority, thus becoming enlightened and more 
free. 
Section III: Freedom 
In Section I of this chapter, Duty and Obligation, I discussed inner freedom. 
Inner freedom is most fully realized in acting for the sake of the moral law. Inner 
freedom is recognized through one's ability to follow the moral law, which is given to 
oneself through reason. Finite rational agents can only know inner freedom because they 
can choose to act for reason or for empirical incentives. Pure rational agents are 
exclusively in the realm of the noumenal and thus only have pure reason to act from. 
Animals do not possess reason and thus have no moral law. Therefore, animals can only 
act in accordance with the laws of nature. Finite rational agents find freedom through 
possessing the ability to choose the moral law or empirical incentives to guide their 
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actions. Finite rational agents cannot escape being subject to moral law or the natural law 
although they are free to choose between them in forming maxims. However, Kant 
maintains that when one chooses to act from one's own reason one is the most free 
because one act's for a law which one gives to oneself. However, one is not determined 
if one acts against the moral law, for an immoral act is a result of a free choice and one 
remains free to choose to act for the moral law at any time. 
In Section II of this chapter, I discussed positive and negative freedom and their 
relation to the will. As mentioned above, Kant maintains that the pure will is negatively 
free from material determination, and that pure will is positively free to determine itself 
formally by its own laws. Wille, in the broad sense, is free in both the negative and the 
positive sense. It is negatively free from being determined by empirical incentives, 
although it can be affected by such incentives. The broad Wille is positively free because 
the narrow Wille legislates to Willkiir, thus making the broad Wille self-legislating. 
In the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals Kant remarks that, "The concept 
of freedom is a pure rational concept ... no instance corresponding to it can be given any 
possible experience ... the concept of freedom cannot hold as a constitutive but solely as 
a regulative and, indeed, merely a negative principle of speculative reason." (Kant, MM 
6:221) As Kant says, moral actions must not only be done in conformity with duty but 
also from duty. Free acts are grounded in one's reason (or will); however, one can be 
impacted or affected by impulses without being fully determined. In the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant says that a human choice cannot be determined by impulses, just merely 
affected. These impulses may diminish one's ability to self-govern, thus decrease one's 
degree of freedom. Freedom, for Kant, is found in both the "external and internal use of 
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choice, insofar as it is determined by laws of reason." (Kant, MM 6:214) All human 
actions rely on decisions; thus an action's first cause is noumenal and not phenomenal. 
Although the phenomenal realm can affect the decisions or actions of an agent, it cannot 
determine them. 
Rational agents come to know freedom through the moral law, and their 
obligation to it. Therefore, this discussion of freedom focuses largely on the nature and 
grounds of obligation. Rational agents recognize that their actions need not be 
necessitated through the sensible or phenomenal realm. Thus, freedom is only known as 
a negative property. Therefore, freedom is not "the ability to make a choice for or against 
the law." (Kant, MM 6:226) This being said it is because we cannot both 
present theoretically freedom as a noumenon, that is, freedom regarded 
as the ability of the human being merely as intelligence, and show 
how it can exercise constraint upon ... sensible choice ... But we can 
indeed see that, although experience shows that the human being as a 
sensible being is able to choose in opposition to as well as in 
conformity with the law, his freedom as an intelligible being cannot 
be defined by this since appearances cannot make any supersensible 
object (such as free choice) understandable. We can also see that 
freedom can never be located in a rational subject's being able to 
choose in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason, even though experience 
proves often enough that this happens. (Kant, MM 6:226; bold 
emphasis added) 
On this conception of Willkiir we cannot give examples (as in phenomenal examples) of a 
free choice (as this posits something as free, and freedom is a negation), but we can give 
examples of choosing for or against the moral law. Some Kantian scholars would like to 
say that when one chooses to act against the moral law, for example when one tells a lie, 
one is not acting freely but instead are being determined by sensuous things, such as 
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inclinations and passions. 13 However, we have seen Kant to say that human beings are 
able to choose in opposition to as well as in conformity with the moral law. It is the 
cause of a choice, or a decision, that determines an action and we cannot know the cause 
of one's actions by looking at the action from a phenomenal standpoint. 
The difficulty that this criticism faces is similar to a category mistake. Human 
beings are both noumenal and phenomenal and precisely in this duality comes our 
capacity to be free. As mentioned above, all animals (or beasts) are purely phenomenal, 
and thus are necessarily determined by the sensible, and holy entities are purely 
noumenal and thus are necessarily determined by reason; for these entities there is no 
room for freedom of choice. However, a human's freedom is not "located in a rational 
subject's being able to choose [the sensible] in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason" 
(Kant, MM 6:226) or vice-versa. Instead, a human being's free choice is in relation to 
forming maxims and then acting. A rational being chooses between different potential 
maxims, which are not sensible things. Choice involves both maxims and actions. 
"Rational agents do not simply have maxims in the sense in which they have inclinations; 
rather they "make something" their maxim, and this always involves the spontaneity of 
Willkiir." (Allison, Kant's Theory, 130) The cause of a free choice is precisely not 
anything we can empirically sense. Free choice is not a phenomenal entity, for if it were 
then this would be how an animal 'chooses'. What distinguishes human choice from 
animal 'choice' is that the latter is determined solely by inclination. In human choice, or 
free choice, there is a lack of determinedness; this lack or negation is what freedom 
means for human beings. Therefore, theoretical freedom cannot be defined in terms of 
13 A couple of these have already been mentioned in the introduction to this thesis; Fackenheim and 
Sidgwick. 
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constraints that humans put on their sensible actions. This would be a positive notion of 
freedom. The problem of defining freedom as one's ability to constrain oneself, or act in 
conformity with a law, is that this requires an appearance to make a supersensible object 
such as free choice understandable. Although experience tells us that one can choose 
against the moral law or for the moral law, this does not explain human freedom. 
Human beings, [are] rational natural beings, who are unholy enough 
that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though 
they recognize its authority ... But since the human being is still a free 
(moral) being, when the concept of duty concerns the internal 
determination of his will (the incentive) the constraint that the concept 
of duty contains can only be self-constraint. .. for only so can the 
necessitation . .. be united with the freedom of his choice. (Kant, MM 
6:380) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on duty and obligation, the distinction Kant makes in the 
Metaphysics of Morals between Wille and Willkiir, and how these topics relate to 
freedom. Section I shows what a finite rational agent's duty is. Rational agents have a 
duty to the moral law. The moral law or categorical imperative is self-prescribed prior to 
empirical incentive. The same moral law is prescribed to each rational agent through 
one's own reason. Thus, for Kant the moral law is universal and a priori. When one 
follows the moral law one is acting from a self-legislating law. Therefore, one is 'most 
free when one's actions are done for the sake of the moral law. However, when one does 
not follow the moral law, one does lose some inner freedom, but one is not determined by 
empirical incentives. Rational moral agents remain aware of their moral duty, or the 
moral law, even when faced with empirical incentives. If one decides to act for empirical 
incentives, instead of the moral law, one is free to do so, and remains free, as one is still 
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aware of what one ought to be acting for. Thus, finite rational agents are free when they 
are acting against the moral law as they remain subject to the moral law, which gives 
them their freedom. 
In Section II, I have outlined the type of will that Kant describes finite rational 
beings to possess. Kant maintains that the will is free and self-legislating. In order for 
Kant to show how it is possible that the will can possess both of these traits, Kant divides 
his explanation of the will into Wille and Willkur. Willkur explains how finite rational 
agents can act against the moral law while remaining free. Wilkur is the capacity to 
choose a maxim either in accordance with the moral law, which is given by the Wille, or 
to for empirical incentives. Thus, although finite rational agents are legislated by reason 
and influenced by nature neither determines them. As Kant says, "Human choice ... is a 
choice that can indeed be affected but is not determined by impulses, and is therefore of 
itself ... not pure but can still be determined to action by pure will. Freedom of choice is 
this independence from being determined by sensible impulses." (Kant, MM 6:214) 
In Section III of this chapter, I have addressed Kant's notion of freedom in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Kant says; freedom is in the noumenal realm, and that one 
cannot see, or sense, an act that is free. All acts take place in the phenomenal realm and 
thus in accordance with the laws of nature. However, the initial causes of free acts are 
noumenal realm. Kant says a human's freedom is not "located in a rational subject's 
being able to choose [the sensible] in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason" (Kant, MM 
6:226) or vice-versa. Instead, a human being's free choice is possible only in relation to 
forming maxims and then acting. A rational subject formulates potential maxims, some 
of which are in accordance with the moral law, others ofwhich are not. Therefore, 
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rational agents can freely choose which maxim they wish to base their actions on. As 
Allison says, choice involves both maxims and actions. "Rational agents do not simply 
have maxims in the sense in which they have inclinations; rather they "make something" 
their maxim, and this always involves the spontaneity of Willkiir." (Allison, Kant's 
Theory 130) Therefore, regardless of whether an action is based on a maxim for the 
moral law or on empirical incentives, one is free to make a choice. Hence, rational finite 
beings can freely choose a maxim to act on, even those which are not in accordance with 
the moral law. 
Whether one's choice coincides with the moral law or violates the moral law, one 
is free to choose a maxim on which to base one's action. With this freedom comes 
responsibility. 
In this chapter we have seen that Kant defines the will in such away that finite 
rational agents can freely choose to act on maxims that are not done for the sake of the 
moral law. Although rational agents have a duty or obligation to the moral law, it does 
not determine them. Rational agents are not determined when not acting for this law. 
The distinction between Wille and Willkur has given us a framework through which we 
can understand why it is that rational agents are freer when acting morally, yet not 
determined when they are acting against the moral law. Rational agents are most free 
when they are acting in accordance with the moral law they give to themselves. 
The Metaphysics of Morals is the first text in which Kant explained the distinction 
between Wille and Willkiir. However, if Kant's earlier philosophy held agents 
accountable for their immoral acts because they are based on freely formed maxims, then 
the distinction between Will and Willkiir must be implicit in his earlier moral philosophy. 
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The following chapters address Kant's earlier moral philosophy. Chapter II, discusses An 
Answer to a Question; What is Enlightenment? and the Groundwork. Chapter III, 
discusses the second Critique. In each of these chapters my main focus is to determine 
whether Kant has claimed that rational agents are free when their maxims are not in 
accordance with the moral law. In Kant's earlier texts he is not as explicit as he is in the 
Metaphysics of Morals regarding one's freedom when acting against the moral law. 
However, along the general lines of Allison's Incorporation Thesis 1\ I believe there is 
ample evidence, whether be it implicit or explicit, that Kant has always maintained a 
rational agent's freedom while choosing to act immorally. 
14 See Section II, titled Literature, of the Introduction to this thesis for a discussion on Allison's 
Incorporation thesis. 
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Chapter II 
Decision, Responsibility and Habit 
In the previous Chapter I outlined the distinction between Wille and Willkiir, as 
Kant presents it in the Metaphysics of Morals. This distinction demonstrates how for Kant 
it is possible for rational agents to freely choose to act against the moral law. I will now 
tum to Kant's earlier work, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? and The 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 1• In Kant's earlier work, he does not explicitly 
introduce the distinction between Wille and Willkiir. This might be because he does not 
hold this distinction until later in his philosophical work or because he does not see it as 
necessary to make this distinction in these particular works. However, I interpret Kant as 
maintaining the distinction between Wille and Willkiir implicitly in his earlier work. 
Without this distinction rational agents cannot be held morally responsible for their 
immoral acts and certain immoral acts would be logically excluded from the framework 
of possible acts2 . Moreover, Kant's textual examples strongly indicate at least the implicit 
presence of the Wille/Willkiir distinction. Therefore, I will argue that interpreting What is 
Enlightenment? and the Groundwork without this distinction between Wille and Willkiir 
gives an incomplete account ofthe fundamentals of Kant's moral framework. 
This chapter looks for evidence in What is Enlightenment? and the Groundwork which 
will indicate that rational beings are responsible for their decisions to act against the 
moral law. This chapter is divided into three main themes, Decision, Responsibility, and 
1 I will refer to An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, simply as What is Enlightenment? and 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, simply as the Groundwork. 
2 An example of an act which is logically excluded from the framework of possibilities is suicide. I have 
thoroughly explained this example in the introduction to this thesis and I will not repeat it in this chapter. 
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Habit. Through showing a moral agent's capacity to freely choose, Kant's notion of 
Willkur is implicitly present in these works. If one has the ability to freely choose 
maxims on which to base one's actions, then one is responsible for those actions. And 
finally, habit is addressed in order to reinforce the notion of being responsible for all acts 
regardless of their relationship to the moral law. In these texts, Kant does not explain, and 
believes one cannot explain, how it is that one can freely choose to act on a maxim that is 
not in accordance with the moral law. However, I intend to argue that Kant nonetheless 
maintains that finite rational beings can freely choose to act against the moral law 
Section 1: Moral Responsibility 
In this first section I will illustrate why moral responsibility is at stake if the 
distinction between Wille and Willkur is not present or at least understood in Kant's 
ethics. To do this I will examine two opposing views on Kant's notion of freedom within 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 3• 
Henry Sidgwick is noted for identifying the 'problem' with Kant's notion of 
freedom 4 • Sidgwick states that his aim "is to show that, in different parts of Kant's 
exposition of his doctrine, two essentially different conceptions are expressed by the same 
word freedom; while yet Kant does not appear to be conscious of any variation in the 
meaning of the term." (Sidgwick, "The Kantian") The notions of freedom that Sidgwick 
highlights are rational freedom and moral freedom. Rational freedom means that man is 
free in so far as he acts in accordance with reason. 5 Freedom in the sense of moral 
3 I briefly addressed this in the Introduction, I will now cover the two opposing views in more detail. 
4 Henry Sidgwick states this in an appendix titled "The Kantian Conception of Free Will" found in Methods 
of Ethics. 
5 Sidgwick's notion of freedom as rationality is the type of freedom one possesses through autonomy. 
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freedom is the type of freedom that is inherent in choosing between good and evil. 
Sidgwick claims that these two notions of freedom are incompatible. Sidgwick says, 
I think that I have now established the verbal ambiguity that I 
undertook to bring home to Kant's account of Free Will; I have shown 
that in his exposition this fundamental term oscillates between 
incompatible meanings ... But I think that a good deal more will have 
to go from a corrected edition of Kantism than merely the "word" 
Freedom in certain passages, if the confusion introduced by the 
ambiguity of this word is to be eliminated. (Sidgwick, "The Kantian 
Conception" Appendix) 
Martin Van Hees represents the other camp, which disagrees with Sidgwick's 
claim that Kant has incompatible notions of freedom within the Groundwork. Van Hees in 
his article titled "Acting Autonomously Versus Not Acting Heteronymously" synthesizes 
what Sidgwick considers two 'incompatible meanings' of freedom. Van Hees states, 
Autonomy is not a characteristic or a property of certain acts, but is 
something that virtually all sane and adult human beings possess. In 
this view, autonomy implies a commitment to certain rational 
constraints. The person who lives up to these commitments could not 
be said to be more autonomous than the person who does not live up to 
those standards. Instead one should say that everyone is autonomous 
but that some are more successful than others in expressing their 
autonomy. (Van Hees, 338)6 
Autonomy is the ability to self govern through exercising one's reason. This corresponds 
to Sidgwick's notion of rational freedom. For Van Hees there is no distinction between 
6 Van Hees' notion that 'virtually all sane and adult human beings possess autonomy' is not very common. 
However, it is one way to attribute freedom to acts that are not done solely for the sake of the moral law. 
Van Hess can therefore argue that all acts are an expression of autonomy and thus an expression of internal 
freedom. Gunnar Beck, in Autonomy, Historv and Political Freedom in Kant's Political Philosophy, states 
on behalf of himself and Mary Gregor that, "men can be autonomous only if they choose to be so, and this 
means that more than one course of action must be open to them. They, therefore, must be free in the 
external sense, free from constraint by others and free to choose between ends that are moral and those that 
are not." (Beck, G., 218) 
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rational freedom and moral freedom in adult human beings. Sidgwick's notion of moral 
freedom is incorporated into Van Hees' notion of autonomy through one's ability to make 
decisions. 
Sidgwick interprets Kant's notion of freedom as disallowing the possibility of 
moral responsibility. He says that when an agent is not autonomous one is not acting 
under the moral law, thus they are determined when choosing immorally. Sidgwick states 
that when choosing "'Neutral' or 'Moral' Freedom, the whole Kantian view of the 
relation of the noumenal to the empirical character will have to be dropped, and with it 
must go the whole Kantian method of maintaining moral responsibility." (Sidgwick, "The 
Kantian Conception" Appendix) This point of view has been coined the "Sidgwick 
Problem," and Paul Guyer explains this problem in "The Value of Reason and the Value 
of Freedom." Guyer states that the Sidgwick problem is "the possibility that freedom and 
adherence to the moral law may on Kant's account be so tightly linked that an immoral 
agent must be considered an unfree agent, and therefore not an agent responsible for his 
misdeeds." (Guyer, "The Value of Reason" 34) However, Van Hees' interpretation of 
Kant's notion of freedom allows agents to be morally responsible, even when acting 
against the moral law because they are still subject to the moral law. 
Kant says, "a free will and a will under moral law are one and the same"(Kant, G 
4:447); however there is no consensus as to what Kant means by this statement. Sidgwick 
notes that "a will subject to its own moral laws may mean a will that, so far as free, 
conforms to these laws; but it also may be conceived as capable of freely disobeying these 
laws." (Sidgwick, "The Kantian Conception" Appendix) First, I will formulate an 
argument to demonstrate that this passage can lead one to believe that one is only free 
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while acting in accordance with the moral law and thus one is not morally responsible for 
one's immoral actions. 
Kant says, "a free will and a will under moral law are one and the same" (Kant, G 
4:447). It can follow that if one is not acting for the moral law then one is not free. If one 
is not free then one is determined. What determines us when not acting for the sake of the 
moral law and thus not acting from reason alone is the phenomenal realm, or our interests 
in the phenomenal realm. When not acting from reason, acts are determined or 
instinctive, and thus directed towards self-preservation, self-promotion, or self-conceit. 
Hence, like an animal, rational agents lack moral responsibility for their actions when the 
action is not done for the moral law, Kant calls these actions heteronomous. When one is 
not responsible for one's actions, particularly those actions that go against the moral law, 
then there is a problem with the ethical system. 
The alternative interpretation is that an agent possessing free will is always under 
the moral law, even when acting heteronomously7 or against the moral law. Kant says, "a 
free will and a will under moral law are one and the same." (Kant, G 4:447) On this 
interpretation there is a difference between acting in accordance with the moral law and 
acting under the moral law. Rational agents whether they are acting for or against the 
moral law always possess the ability to reason and thus cannot avoid being under the 
moral law. George Schrader makes this argument in "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral 
Imperatives." Schrader states, "man cannot escape the moral law because he cannot 
escape his own rationality. Man's reason makes an inexorable demand upon him at all 
times, which makes him morally responsible no matter what he may do." (Schrader, 71) 
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Section II: Decision 
In What is Enlightenment? Kant writes that moral agents have a responsibility to 
make decisions and not act out of mere habit or passive agreement. Kant states at the 
beginning ofthis text, 
Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from self-incurred 
minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own 
understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-
incurred when its cause lies not in a lack of understanding but in a 
lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from 
another, Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use 
of your own understanding. (Kant, AQWE 8:35) 
In What is Enlightenment?, Kant is not concerned whether a person's autonomous 
decision coincides with the dominant or the majority's opinion, but all that matters is that 
it is one's own decision. Taking ownership of a decision can only be achieved through 
exercising resolution and courage to make use of the understanding. Kant says it is easy 
to have one's pastor, a book, physicians, or elders think for them, however it is necessary 
to free oneself from other's opinions because this allows one to become enlightened. 
Kant is concerned that one's decisions are done from reason or moral law because what is 
done from the moral law is necessarily in accordance with the moral law. 
In What is Enlightenment? Kant distinguishes between the public and private use 
of one's reason and through doing so places moral limits on decisions. Kant says 
enlightenment "is the freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point .. 
. [However,] ... the private use of one's own reason may ... often be very narrowly 
restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment." (Kant, 
AQWE 8:37) By "public use of reason" Kant is referring to the liberty that a scholar has 
in front of the public world. By private use of reason Kant is referring to the use of 
7 This is the way in which Martin Van Hees and others in his camp would interpret this Kant quote. 
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reason with respect to a certain civil post, or office which the subject has been entrusted 
with. Therefore, when individuals are acting as militants, priests, or as any other civil 
servants, they must fulfill their specific duties. However, when these individuals are not 
participating in their civil rule, such as off-duty military personnel, they can exercise their 
public use of reason without constraint. While people are acting in the private sphere 
they cannot be absolutely free as they are acting under another's commission. For 
example, when a person is in the role of a soldier he or she takes orders from an officer 
and thus the soldier's private use of his or her reason is restricted by one's duty to the 
officer. (Kant, AQWE 8:38) 
Kant's enlightenment project is initiated through a decision. According to 
Katerina Deligiorgi in Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment, "Kant's statement that we 
do not live in an enlightened age but rather in an 'age of enlightenment' (VII:40, WE58) 
suggests that he is concerned with defining a process." (Deligiorgi, 57) The process of 
enlightenment is not one that involves conforming to a majority, but instead focuses on 
having the courage to decide, or exercise one's own reason. Deligiorgi states, "the 
universal reason in which "each and everyone has a voice" is not a yea-saying chorus, but 
made up of distinct voices that can be individuated through disagreement."(Deligiorgi, 
90) The enlightenment process is aimed at creating autonomous subjects. Autonomous 
subjects are those people who legislate for themselves through their own reason. 
Although Kant does not use the term "enlightenment" in the Groundwork, the 
capacity that a rational agent has to decide continues to play a necessary role in attributing 
moral worth to rational agents. In the Groundwork Kant distinguishes humans from other 
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animals. Rational beings, such as human beings, have the ability to decide. Kant 
recognizes this ability as the precursor for moral worth in human action. It is her/his 
ability to reason that distinguishes a finite rational agent from other animals, and thus 
grants the ability to be a moral agent. Animals do not possess the ability to reason and 
make decisions and are therefore determined by their instincts. An animal's instinct 
always directs an animal to a path of self-preservation. The faculty of reason must have 
an end other than self-preservation because reason does not merely allow rational agents 
to preserve themselves, but allows them to fulfill a higher moral end. In the Groundwork 
Kant says, 
... a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were 
its preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature 
would have hit upon a very bad argument in selecting the reason of 
the creature to carry out this purpose. For all of the actions that the 
creature has to perform for this purpose ... would be marked out for it 
far more accurately by instinct ... we must admit, instead, that these 
judgements have as their covert basis the idea of another far worthier 
purpose of one's existence, to which therefore ... reason is properly 
destined. (Kant, G 4:395-6) 
The 'far worthier' purpose that Kant is referring to is found in the relation between reason 
and the will. Kant says, "The true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is 
good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself, for which reason is 
absolutely necessary." (Kant, G 4:396) Thus, the 'far worthier' purpose is to produce a 
will that is good in itself, which is only possible through exercising one's reason. 
Exercising reason is necessary in order for one's actions to have moral worth. Thus, the 
ability to decide is a necessary condition of the moral worth of action and disposition. 
The decision one must make when deciding whether to act morally is to either act 
from incentive or from reason alone. A decision that is free from empirical incentive has 
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moral worth, however one that is based on the outcome, or empirical incentive has no 
moral worth. One can be morally good only if one decides to act for the sake of the moral 
law. However, if one's actions merely coincide with the moral law but were not done for 
the moral law, then these acts are not morally good. Likewise, if actions are not based on 
maxims that represent the moral law then these actions are not morally good, and in order 
to demonstrate this Kant uses the example of a shopkeeper. (Kant, G 4:398) Kant states a 
shopkeeper has decided to treat all of his customers without bias, thus he charges an adult 
customer the same amount he charges a child customer. It is possible that the shopkeeper 
could have raised his price for the child because the child is inexperienced and would 
have paid the higher price. However, the shopkeeper does not do this, instead he charges 
all customers the same price. If the shopkeeper does change his price depending on the 
customer, then this decision is not in accordance with reason and we would be able to 
know this through his actions of not maintaining a consistent price regardless of the 
customers. However, if the shopkeeper has made a decision to act in conformity with 
reason, then we must ask what was the shopkeeper's motive in this decision. It is the 
motive to act that is morally relevant. However, the shopkeeper could make this decision 
based on an outward empirical incentive. The empirical incentive that the shopkeeper 
could base his decision on is the threat or consequence of getting caught charging a child 
a higher price than an adult. Although the empirical incentive would lead the shopkeeper 
to a decision to charge children the same price as adults, it is not a morally good decision. 
The decision to charge children and adults the same price, if decided upon to avoid being 
caught doing the wrong thing, conforms to duty although it was not made from duty. The 
decision to charge children the same price as adults can be brought about through 
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incentives or by reason; however the decision only has moral worth if it was made from 
duty to the moral law, or reason. (Kant, G 4:397) The shopkeeper in this example made 
his decision, not for material incentives but because it was the rational thing to do. If the 
shopkeeper made his decision based on self-interest that is not from an immediate 
inclination yet not from reason, then this decision still lacks moral worth, as self-interest 
is irrational. 
In both What is Enlightenment? and the Groundwork decisions play a key role in Kant's 
ethical system. In What is Enlightenment? one's decision is what allows one to embark on the 
enlightenment process. It is necessary that one be courageous in one's decision-making. One must 
decide for oneself, making oneself the sole cause of one's decision and thus, responsible for one's 
own actions. In the Groundwork Kant is very clear that the morally worthy decision must be made 
for the right reason. If acts merely coincide with maxims that represent the moral law but the acts 
were not done for the moral law itself, then the act is not morally good. One's ability to decide on 
an action entails responsibility for that action. Therefore, we do not hold animals responsible for 
their actions because they do not have the ability to reason options and make decisions; likewise, 
our expectations of children reflect their ability, or lack of ability, to formulate alternative options 
before making decisions. 
Section III: Duties and Responsibility 
In George Schrader's article, "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and Moral Imperatives," 
he outlines the relationship that Kant implies between duties, responsibility, and the 
moral law. Although Kant does not use the term "responsibility" it seems clear that any 
ethical system that revolves around what 'ought to be', or the notion of duty, must 
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include the notion of responsibility. Schrader states, "Man can have duties to himself 
only because he is responsible for himself." (Schrader, 71) Kant bases his moral 
philosophy around 'what ought to be' and thus the duties one has in order to fulfill 'what 
ought to be'. In Kantian ethics, one has a duty or responsibility to bring about what 
'ought to be' under the moral law. Schrader argues, as do I, that "[t]he validity of the 
moral law depends upon the fact that it specifies the fundamental conditions of 
responsible existence." (Schrader, 70) This responsibility is possible because rational 
beings have the ability to choose what they ought to do. Through the ability to choose, 
decide, or act and not merely react, rational beings (even when acting irrationally) are 
held accountable for their maxims and their actions. 
Some Kantian scholars, such as Mike Horenstein, interpret Kant as saying that if 
one's actions are not done for the sake of the moral law then the agent was determined 
and thus not free, as rational agents are only free under the moral law. Horenstein, in 
"The Question Concerning Freedom in Kantian Moral Philosophy," asks, "How can an 
intelligent man regard himself in any way 'responsible' (in the Kantian sense) for an act 
which, on its empirical side, is a necessary link in a causal chain in which he himself is 
entangled8 and, on its noumenal side is the expression of his intelligible character, which 
is the inevitable manifestation of eternal reason?" (Horenstein, 143) Although Kant does 
say that rational agents are free under the moral law he does not say whether or not 
rational agents can escape the moral law. If one has reason, one has the moral law. The 
moral law and freedom are reciprocal concepts; thus, not through exercising reason but 
8 The first part of Horenstein's question will be answered more directly in Chapter III section III, 'Critical 
Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason.' 
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in possessing the ability to reason 9 , the moral law and freedom are both present. Just 
because one has the ability to reason does not mean that one always uses it. What is 
Enlightenment? teaches us how one ought to go about exercising one's reason, not how to 
gain reason in the first place. In other words, being a rational being is not the same as 
exercising reason, but nonetheless only a rational being can exercise reason. Thus, an 
animal cannot embark on the enlightenment process; only 'rational beings' have a way in 
which they ought to act. 
The claim I make, that rational agents are always under the moral law even when 
acting against the moral law, is supported by Schrader in "Autonomy, Heteronomy, and 
Moral Imperatives." Schrader argues, 
We have no more option whether to be subject to the moral law than 
whether we are to be human subjects. As rational and responsible 
beings we are liable before the moral law as the inexorable demand of 
our own rationally informed wills ... On Kant's view man is a creature 
under law. The moral imperative is not that which should obtain but 
which does obtain; it is the de facto 'ought' governing all human 
actions ... If this were not so, the moral imperative would be 
hypothetical rather than categorical. (Schrader, 69) 
Another way of formulating this argument would be to say that the will of rational 
beings is never amoral; there is always a moral imperative that is given and that choice 
ought to follow. 
In writing An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Kant demonstrates 
that finite rational agents have the ability to decide to exercise reason and not to simply 
act in accordance with the majority. Thus, Kant states that rational agents have a 
responsibility to themselves to decide to act from their own reason. Responsibility to 
oneself and others plays a key role in the enlightenment process. In order to become 
9 Kant makes this point clearly in the Metaphysics of Morals as we saw in the previous chapter. 
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enlightened one must decide to act, or 'emerge from his self-incurred minority'. 
Enlightenment is a responsibility that one has to him or herself, which can only be 
achieved through a certain amount of independence from others. However, Kant also 
indicates that individuals and the human race have a responsibility to others to engage in 
the enlightenment process. Therefore, in Kant's account we are responsible before we 
are enlightened and we know this because Kant indicates to us that we have a 
responsibility to become enlightened. 
Kant does not explicitly discuss the term "responsibility" in What is 
Enlightenment? However, Kant does claim that it is because of laziness and cowardice 
that many humans remain unenlightened. Paul Guyer in "Kant on the Theory and 
Practice of Autonomy" outlines the enlightenment process as a self-engaging life-long 
endeavour. Guyer states, 
The freedom to be autonomous is something that human beings develop 
only over the course of an extended process of maturation and 
education, and only to a degree that might well vary over a lifetime and 
might vary for different people. Perhaps we are even likely to conclude 
that some human beings cannot and do not get very far in this process at 
all. (Guyer, "Kant on the Theory" 80) 
Through Kant's language, we can certainly infer that the path of enlightenment is 
one which free agents should or ought to engage in. Kant says, "To renounce 
enlightenment, whether for his own person or even more so for posterity, is to violate the 
sacred right of humanity and trample it underfoot." (Kant, AQWE 8:39) Each of us has 
the responsibility to be courageous, to free ourselves from dependence upon others' 
opinions, to think and to decide for ourselves, and to exercise our reason and 
understanding. Each of us has the responsibility to choose to act in accordance with our 
own rational understanding. 
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This being said there is also a responsibility that each of us has to others, which is 
to become enlightened. Deligiorgi claims, "One reasons for oneself, but one does not 
reason alone ... there is a corresponding social side to maturity ... Enlightenment must be 
considered both as a process in which men participate collectively and as an act of 
courage to be accomplished personally ... On Kant's account, enlightenment cannot be 
just a personal project that each individual undertakes in isolation from others." 
(Deligiorgi 57-8) We get a clear sense of this from Kant's discussion on the 
responsibilities of the clergyman. Kant says, 
As a scholar he [the clergyman] has complete freedom and is even 
called upon to communicate to the public all his carefully examined and 
well-intentioned thoughts about what is erroneous in that creed and his 
suggestions for a better arrangement of the religious and ecclesiastical 
body ... For that the guardians of the people (in spiritual matters) 
should themselves be minors is an absurdity that amounts to the 
perpetuation of absurdities. (AQWE 8:38) 
Therefore, because the clergyman has the responsibility to guide others, the clergymen 
must lead and not simply be led by the majority's opinion. The clergyman has a 
responsibility to the people for whom he is a guardian, to engage the path of 
enlightenment. Only when the clergyman has the courage to exercise his reason can he 
set an example and be a competent spiritual coach. 
Thus, in What is Enlightenment? Kant clearly sees people as having a duty or 
responsibility to act from their own reason. This responsibility precedes one actually 
acting from reason. When one is still in a state of minority Kant says that one has a duty 
or responsibility to act as a rational being, or to act from one's reason alone. This point is 
demonstrated in the first line of What is Enlightenment? when Kant refers to the state of 
minority as a self-incurred minority. 
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The ideals that Kant holds in What is Enlightenment? do not change in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Responsibility and duty play key roles in 
making an agent morally good. I will discuss responsibility in relation to the Groundwork 
in terms of a rational being's responsibility to act from reason and thus with moral worth. 
As I established in the section on 'decision' what distinguishes humans from animals is 
that humans have reason whereas animals merely have instinct. An animal's instinct for 
Kant is always directed towards self-preservation. However, human beings have the 
faculty of reason and therefore they have a responsibility to strive for a 'far worthier' 
purpose than mere self-preservation. Kant claims that the highest good is recognized 
through reason alone; thus the highest good is distinct from all empirical incentives. 
Every rational being has the faculty of reason and thus a will. The will (Wille as a 
singularity that includes a duality, or the pure Wille) is good in itself; its good is distinct 
from any further purpose. In judging the worth of one's action, we cannot look at the 
results, or outcome, of one's actions, because the result of one's actions can never tell 
whether the act was carried out for the sake of reason or if the act was carried out for an 
empirical incentive 10 • The worth of an action is dependent on whether or not the action 
was carried out from reason and thus is in harmony with the highest good. Because the 
will (or pure reason) is the highest good, each of us has a duty or a responsibility to act 
from reason and not for mere incentives. A slightly different way to interpret Kant 
regarding what an act must be based on in order for it to be a morally good act is stated by 
Guyer in an article titled "The Value of Agency." Guyer states, "It might seem as if 
Kant's insistence that moral appraisal is based on intentions rather than consequences, 
10 A previous example of this was the shopkeeper who did not take advantage of children by charging them 
a higher price than his adult customers. 
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most famously stated in section 1 of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, could 
be saved simply by interpreting it as an insistence on the moral appraisal of intended 
outcomes rather than actual outcomes." (Guyer, 419) 
However, it is not always obvious whether an action was performed for an 
incentive or for the sake of the moral law. Sometimes the morally right thing to do is also 
the thing that will bring about the most highly sought after reward or incentive. This 
arises when an action is in conformity with duty and there is an immediate inclination to 
perform this action. The difficulty is to know whether this action was performed from 
duty or from a self-seeking purpose. For example, if the teacher asks the student "did you 
cheat on the test?" and the student replies "No, I did not cheat on the test," then it is 
difficult to know whether the student acted from the moral law or from empirical 
incentives. 
To demonstrate the finer points about duty I will use one of Kant's examples. 
Kant says that to preserve one's life is a duty. If one preserves one's own life but only so 
he or she can go on carelessly to enjoy life's pleasures, then this act is in conformity with 
duty. However, it is not done from duty, and thus it lacks moral worth. On the other hand 
if one wishes to end one's life so one no longer has to suffer, but still preserves it, not 
because of fear or incentives, then this act has moral worth, because one preserved his or 
her life from duty. Thus, 
An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be 
attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided 
upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the object 
of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance 
with which the action is done without regard for any object of the 
faculty of desire. (Kant, G 4:400) 
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When looking at actions, it is impossible to know if they are performed from duty. 
"In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete 
certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty 
rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one's duty ... What counts 
is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see." 
(Kant, G 4:407) It is a person's intention, or what one's decision is based on, and not 
solely one's actions that make him or her a morally responsible or dutiful agent. If the 
person's intentions are based in reason, and not simply on empirical incentives or 
feelings, then his or her actions are in accordance with the moral law and his or her 
decision has moral worth. Because moral concepts are formed from reason alone they 
originate completely a priori. Therefore, moral concepts "cannot be abstracted from any 
empirical and therefore merely contingent cognitions; that just in this purity of their origin 
lies their dignity, so ... they can serve us as supreme practical principles." (Kant, G 
4:412) Reason gives us laws and "duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law." 
(Kant, G 4:400) These laws and thus action from duty to these laws are free of 
determination by empirical influence. "Hence there is left for the will nothing that could 
determine it except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical 
law, and so the maxim of complying with such a law even if it infringes upon all my 
inclinations." (Kant, G 4:400-1) 
This being said I must soften this position a little, as humans always exist in both 
the phenomenal and the noumenal world 11 ; therefore humans can never be completely in 
11 Eric Sandberg in "Causa Noumenon and Homo Phaenomenon" states that, "The distinction between the 
empirical and the intelligible character is not a distinction between the machine-like and the rational parts of 
the self. The distinction is rather one between explanatory levels, and rationality is a characteristic of both 
levels." (Sandberg, 279) 
58 
the noumenal 12 realm, and thus a person's decisions may have to incorporate some 
empirical influences. 
Allison gives us what he refers to as the "Incorporation Thesis," which 
presupposes Kant's description of transcendental idealism. As Allison says, the 
"transcendental distinction is not primarily between two kinds of entities, appearances and 
things in themselves, but rather between two distinct ways in which the objects of human 
experience may be 'considered' in philosophical reflection, namely, as they appear and as 
they are." (Allison, Kant's Theory 3-4) This argument will allow Allison to side-step 
some of the problems surrounding the noumenal-phenomenal distinction. 
Before I discuss Allison's work regarding the inclusion of incentives into moral 
maxims, we first need Allison's definitions of transcendental freedom and practical 
freedom. Allison states, practical freedom is "understood negatively as the will's 
independence of determination by sensuous impulses and positively as the capacity to act 
on the basis of reason [whereas transcendental freedom is] absolute spontaneity and 
complete independence from everything sensible." (Allison, 1990, 444) The 
Incorporation Thesis deals with practical freedom, however the question arises as to what 
sense is practical freedom limited by and distinguishable from transcendental freedom? 
(Allison, Kant's Theory 445) Transcendental freedom is independent from all sensuous 
affections, whereas practical freedom is independent from determination. Therefore, we 
can understand practical freedom as spontaneity, and thus as causally independent, or as 
12 For Kant only the divine is completely noumenal, as it does not exist in the phenomenal realm. Kant 
states "No imperatives holds for the divine will. .. because volition is of itself necessarily in accord with the 
law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in 
general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, for example, the human will." 
(Kant, G 4:414) 
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Kant states practical freedom is 'independence from the causality of nature.' On the other 
hand, transcendental freedom as autonomy involves the capacity to determine oneself to 
act completely independent of one's needs as a sensuous being. Only a divine will can 
possess the independence that is required to be completely transcendentally free, because 
the divine does not receive any sensuous input, whereas the human will does. The 
problem that arises from this discussion on freedom is that it appears as though it requires 
rational agents to be bound only by hypothetical imperatives, and that the possibility of 
being bound to the categorical imperative is not present. Through Allison's introduction 
of his Incorporation Thesis he addresses this problem. 
The Incorporation Thesis can be stated in Kant's own words as: "freedom of the 
will [ Willkiir] is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine the will to an 
action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into 
the general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself ... )" (Kant, R WLRA 
39-40, 1990, 24). Thus, rational agents possess a will and can only be 'determined' to act 
by an incentive if they incorporate that incentive into their maxim. In other words, desires 
and other types of incentives can only move one to act if one chooses to permit them to 
move one. 
As mentioned earlier I have presupposed transcendental idealism and this allows 
me the liberty to explain the Incorporation Thesis in a unique way. The rational agent has 
a double character, these characters being empirical and intelligible. The rational agent's 
empirical model of character is assigned the beliefs and desires while the intelligible 
model of one's character is responsible for deliberating rationally thus appealing to 
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spontaneity. (Allison, 1990, 5) Because both aspects of this character of rational agency 
are always present all of its acts incorporate spontaneity. 
As evident from the discussion above regarding the Incorporation Thesis, maxims 
play a key role in demonstrating the possibility of agents acting against the moral law of 
their own volition and thus not being causally determined to do so by the empirical realm. 
Allison's Incorporation Thesis does not always represent Kant's views. Like 
Marcia Baron in "Henry Allison on Kant's Theory of Freedom," I have a difficult time 
accepting Allison's conclusion, which is, "if as free agents we are tempted, it is only 
because we, as it were, allow ourselves to be." (Allison 164, Baron 778) The problem is 
that the Incorporation Thesis tells rational agents that if they give in to temptation it is 
because they choose to, but this is not the same as saying they choose whether they feel 
tempted. The Incorporation Thesis is concerned with formulating maxims, not feelings. 
Thus, rational agents do not necessarily have a say as to whether they are tempted, yet 
they can choose whether this temptation is included in their maxims. Baron also 
criticized Allison's Incorporation Thesis for excluding the possibility of agents being 
morally weak or frail. Kant notes that people can recognize the morally good thing to do, 
but fail to do the good act because of their frailty. However, according to Allison's 
Incorporation Thesis, rational agents can never be overcome by desire, unless they 
incorporate it in to their maxim, and thus it would seem it is no longer a morally weak 
decision to choose the wrong action. Nevertheless, these problems are minor and do not 
limit the fact that finite rational agents freely choose. 
Through this approach, we will have to pay particular attention to the fact that 
spontaneity, which is the kind of freedom that allows for the Incorporation Theory can be 
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thought but not experienced. As Kant's transcendental idealism tells us, spontaneity is 
"merely intelligible." Thus, spontaneity does not, "enter into an empirical account or 
explanation ofhuman action." (Allison, Kant's Theory 5) 
Rational agents have a duty or responsibility to act on maxims that represent pure 
reason, and because pure practical reason is free from empirical incentives and is given a 
priori to all rational agents, there is the same imperative for all rational agents. However, 
there is only one imperative that is based on reason alone. "This imperative is 
categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action and what is to result from it, but 
with the form and the principle from which the action itself follows; and the essentially 
good in the action consists in the disposition, let the result be what it may." (Kant, G 
4:416) The categorical imperative is the imperative of morality. 
The imperative contains, beyond the law, only the necessity that the 
maxim be in conformity with this law, while the law contains no 
condition to which it would be limited, nothing is left with which the 
maxim of action is to conform but the universality of a law as such; 
and this conformity alone is what the imperative properly represents 
as necessary ... There is, therefore, only a single categorical 
imperative and it is this: act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law. (Kant, G 4:421) 
All imperatives of duty can be derived from this single imperative. 
There are two different ways of categorizing duties. Duties are either duties to 
one's self or duties to others, and these duties are either imperfect duties or perfect duties. 
Kant gives us four examples through which we can see the four different combinations of 
responsibilities. 
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Duties to Oneself Duties to Others 
Perfect Duties Not to commit suicide To reframe from 
or act from self love making false promises 
arising from a need to 
borrow money 
Imperfect Duties To pursue talent, and Benevolence, helping 
not neglect one's others and not fending 
natural gift for oneself alone 
The example Kant gives as a perfect duty to oneself is this; if one feels sick of life 
and is full of despair but is still capable of exercising one's reason to ask one's self 
"whether it would be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires 
whether the maxim of his action could indeed become a universal law of nature 13 ." 
(Kant, G 4:422) His maxim is that from self-love I shorten my life when the longer 
duration threatens to bring more upset then agreeableness. When this maxim is put to the 
universality test, one must ask whether the principle of self-love become a universal law 
of nature. Because it could never be a universal law of nature to destroy oneself, this 
maxim cannot be universalized and is therefore morally impermissible, or in other words, 
taking one's own life is not a moral duty. 
An example of a "perfect duty to others" would be to always tell the truth. One 
can see the necessity of this duty by taking the anti-thesis and testing it. Suppose one 
finds oneself in a situation in which one needs money. However, the only way one can 
borrow money is if one promises to return it, and although he or she makes this promise, 
13 Kant states that 'There is ... Only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law. " (Kant, G 
4:421) However, Kant reformulates this law, and this reformulation is where the universality test comes 
from. Kant states, 'The universal imperative of duty can also go as follows: act as if the maxim of your 
action were to become by your will a universal law of nature." (Kant, 4:421) 
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he or she knows that the money will never be repaid. The maxim of this action would be 
"when I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to 
repay it, even though I know this will never happen. Now this principle of self-love or 
personal advantage is perhaps quite consistent with my whole future welfare, but the 
question now is whether it is right." (Kant, G 4:422) When this maxim is turned into a 
universal law it will become apparent whether or not the action that follows from this 
maxim is morally good. It is clear that this maxim as a universal law of nature necessarily 
contradicts itself. "For, the universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself 
to be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it 
would make the promise and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one 
would believe what was promised [to] him." (Kant, G 4:422) 
The two examples given thus far are examples of perfect duties because the 
universality test gives a clear and distinct reply when asking if the maxim is in harmony 
with the moral law. In each of the above examples, I have shown that ifthe maxims that 
Kant gave were universalized and implemented as a (natural) law, then the law would be 
self-contradictory. Therefore, reason tells us that these maxims cannot hold as laws at all. 
The next two examples deal with imperfect duties. 
The third example is of an imperfect duty to oneself; Kant describes a person who 
"finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to give himselfup to pleasure 
than to trouble himself with enlarging and improving his fortunate natural predispositions. 
But he still asks himself whether his maxim of neglecting his natural gifts ... [is] ... 
consistent with what one calls duty." (Kant, G 4:423) He sees that nature could manage 
to survive with a universal law that does not require him to maximize his natural gifts 
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however he cannot rationally will this to become a universal law. In other words, one 
would not will natural instinct to stop working towards maximizing one's potential, and 
be replaced with idleness, and amusement. "For, as a rational being he necessarily wills 
that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for 
all sorts of possible purposes." (Kant, G 4:423) 
Lastly, an example of an imperfect duty to others is to "let each be as happy as the 
heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; 
only I do not care to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need!" 
(Kant, G 4:423) If this way of thinking were to become a universal law, humans would 
carry on, and if this were implemented as a universal law of nature, nature too would 
carry on, however it is impossible to will that such a principle be held as a universal law 
(of nature). "For a will that decides this would conflict with itself, since many cases 
could occur in which one would need love and sympathy of others and in which, by such 
a law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all the hope of the 
assistance he wishes for himself." (Kant, G 4:423) 
The third and fourth examples are examples of imperfect duties. They are 
considered imperfect because they do not contradict the universal law; however they are 
not supported by the universality test. In both cases, it is impossible to will that the 
principle to neglect one's personal talents or the principle to neglect others when they are 
in need, can become a universal law (of nature). 
After examining different types of actions and different types of duties, along with 
examples to represent these combinations it becomes apparent that there is some 
flexibility in executing imperfect duties. The categorical imperative is universal and a 
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priori, however, the maxims that represent this imperative are not explicit in this 
imperative. Therefore, rational agents must execute their faculty of reason and by doing 
so exercise their ability to choose, in order to act in accordance with the moral law. 
Nelson Potter makes this argument in an article titled "Maxims in Kant's Moral 
Philosophy." Potter states that "Kant tells us that ethical duties are of broad obligation, 
which means some discretion is allowed in determining the specific action to be 
performed." (Potter, 75) 
If it is true that one has the ability to choose to act on a maxim that is in 
accordance with the moral law, then one has the ability to choose not to act on a maxim 
that is in accordance with the moral law. Potter says, 
[When one exercises one's power to act contrary to the moral law] such 
an action is in accordance with the basic formal maxim of the agent. .. 
So here the proper order of the incentives is precisely reversed. This 
policy choice is expressed (exemplified) in the present action. Since, 
Kant insists, both kinds of incentives are present and available, the 
moral agent was free to choose differently and such actions are also free, 
though the agent does not make use of the moral power she possesses to 
act differently ... [The agent's] moral capacity for choice, helps make 
sense of Kant's claim that the agent is free also in actions not from the 
motive of duty, even though freedom is defined in terms of the power of 
acting from the motive of duty. (Potter, 77) 
When one chooses something one is choosing against something else, otherwise there is 
no real choice. Hence, the ability that a rational agent has to make choices represents that 
being's freedom. 
Section IV: Habit 
The process of enlightenment is embarked upon through making responsible 
decisions for oneself. As we have established earlier, a person becomes enlightened when 
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he or she has the courage to exercise his or her reason and understanding. However, in 
the opening section of What is Enlightenment? Kant stresses what 'enlightenment' is in 
reference to others. Kant says that agents become enlightened when they exercise their 
reason and understanding without direction from another, and thus they think for 
themselves. But I would like to ask; "Is the person who relies on habit in the process of 
becoming enlightened?" A habit is not necessarily reliant on the influence of the majority 
nor is it brought on through exercising one's reason and understanding. A habit, either in 
terms of the way one thinks or acts, is performed without rational deliberation. 
I will use an example to help me answer this question about habit. In a 
democracy, when one comes to be a certain age, one is allowed to cast a vote. If one 
chooses which party one votes for based on who one's parents voted for, then it is safe to 
say that this is an unenlightened decision. It is an unenlightened decision because it is 
based solely on the direction of others. However, if this person decides which party he or 
she votes for by exercising his or her reason, and thus carefully chooses what party he or 
she believes is the best candidate for the job, then this would be considered an enlightened 
decision. This is an enlightened decision because one has exercised one's own reason to 
decide which party one will vote for. However, if the next time this person votes for the 
same party because it is who he or she voted for previously, then this person is forming a 
habit of voting for the same party. The question I intend to answer is whether a habitual 
decision is an enlightened one since it is made without determining direction from others, 
but is still not done through exercising one's own reason. 
In a habitual decision there is no consideration involved, thus, one's habitual 
decision was not influenced by what someone else directed this person to decide, nor was 
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this habitual decision a result of exercising one's own reason and understanding. After 
this habit has been formed, it makes no difference whether the person initially voted based 
on his or her own reason or merely conformed with the majority, because enlightenment 
is a process. In order to be enlightened one must continually act from one's own reason 
and understanding. Kant says, 
Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from self-incurred 
minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding 
without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its 
cause lies not in a lack of understanding but in a lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without direction from another, Sapere aude! [Dare to 
be wise!] Have courage to make use of your own understanding. (Kant, 
AQW£8:35) 
Although Kant stresses enlightenment in terms of autonomous independence from 
others, this is not what is key to enlightenment. The most fundamental aspect of 
enlightenment is that one uses one's own reason and understanding. Thus, it should seem 
apparent that acting out of mere habit is not daring to use one's courage, nor is it being 
wise. Simply because a decision is not in conformity with the majority or does not stem 
from the opinion of the majority, does not mean it is necessarily an enlightened decision, 
because this decision may merely be a habitual act, or a passive decision. In order for a 
decision to be enlightened, it must be a result of exercising one's own reason. 
In Henry Allison's book titled Kant's Theory of Freedom, Allison addresses what 
a maxim for a habitual act might consist of. Allison states, 
A maxim I could never be aware of as mine, like a representation to 
which I could not attach the "I think," would be "nothing to me" as a 
rational agent. It might function as an unconscious drive or habitus 
governing my behavior, but it would not be a principle on which I act 
as a rational agent. .. Rational agents can, of course, adopt foolish or 
immoral maxims, but they cannot adopt maxims without taking them 
to be, in some sense, justified (although this may very well rest on 
self-deception). (Allison, 90-1) 
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In relation to the habitual vote, the voter cannot attach 'I think' to the vote because there 
is nothing to base such a claim on. Therefore, Allison and I both maintain that it is 
obvious that the habitual voter is not exercising his or her reason in conformity to the 
moral law. However, unlike Allison, I do believe that the rational agent can decide to act 
out of habit because the agent is still deciding and it is the capacity to choose that makes 
the agent a rational agent. Thus, even when a person acts from mere habit he or she is 
still responsible because that person still has the capacity to choose to do otherwise. A 
person cannot escape responsibilities because a person chooses not to exercise one's own 
reason. As a rational agent, whether or not one acts rationally, one retains the capacity to 
choose, or to exercise Willkiir. Thus, although I agree with Allison's Incorporation 
Thesis, I believe that he needs to extend this thesis to include all adult finite rational 
agents' actions. My interpretation of Kant leads me to believe that if one is acting out of 
mere habit then this is equivalent in someway to acting in an unenlightened fashion. It is 
not as though one is taking direction from another, but that one is not exercising one's 
own reason. Whenever one is not exercising one's reason and has the capacity to do so 
one is acting immorally. In this case, one is not determined by anything except one's own 
laziness not to exercise one's reason. I believe that Allison needs to broaden or rework 
his Incorporation Thesis to include habitual acts. 
Throughout this chapter I have discussed the importance of exercising one's own 
reason. However, what if the voter from our last example exercised his or her reason 
while making a decision on which party to vote for, but then realized that the best overall 
person for the job would not, in some way, benefit him or her the most. For example, 
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what if the individual voted for a party that he or she knew was not the best candidate for 
the job but instead this individual voted for the weaker party because he or she was paid 
to do so. Has this individual made an enlightened decision? Has this person exercised his 
or her reason and acted on it? 
This is not an enlightened decision because the individual took direction from 
another, in the form of a bribe, while making his or her decision. Therefore, one has put 
one's self in the minority or in effect, has chosen one's own minority. 14 This person has 
exercised his or her reason but not to the extent that he or she was brave or courageous 
enough to act on it. This person knowingly contradicted his or her reason, by letting other 
incentives interfere. This individual freely chose to act in such a way that he or she knew 
to be wrong and immoral. It is irresponsible for this person to knowingly act against his 
or her reason. In every case, when a person knowingly makes a decision that is against 
his or her reason the person has betrayed his or her human nature, thus a person has 
knowingly done something to harm him or her self. Kant states, "to renounce 
enlightenment, whether for their own person or even more so for posterity, is to violate 
the sacred right of humanity and trample it underfoot." (Kant, AQWE 8:40) This is true 
whether the person has lied or maliciously harmed another. 
In the Groundwork Kant does not mention habit; however we know that actions 
that conform to reason but are not done from reason lack moral worth. When one is 
acting from reason and not for any other incentive one would necessarily be aware of 
one's actions and the maxim which one's actions are based on. However, habitual actions 
14 One may say that the voter and the soldier, from an earlier discussion, have something in common. Both 
the voter and the soldier are not acting as freely as they could because they are not acting for the sake of the 
moral law. However, the voter has chosen to act for empirical incentives while the soldier decides to take 
orders from the state. Thus, the soldier is fulfilling a moral duty to the state. 
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do not entail such a level of awareness of one's own actions. Thus, it is apparent that 
habitual acts, even if the acts conform to one's duty (or responsibility) are not done from 
reason, although the agent is still a rational agent. 
I introduced an example of a person who habitually votes for the same political 
party. This individual is not acting with moral worth because this act is done out of 
comfort or ease and not by exercising one's reason. This point can be made stronger ifl 
borrow one of Kant's examples. Kant shows us that it is always morally wrong to make a 
false promise 15 • If one habitually makes a false promise whether it be about the same 
thing such as denying something in one's past, or committing to marry someone one has 
no intention of marrying, we know that this is immoral because it is in conflict with duty. 
However, what about a person who habitually makes true promises? That is, what about 
the person who tells the truth but may not know why one is doing so, or one may just be 
doing so because it is the comfortable thing to do. We could imagine that in the past this 
person had made a false promise and felt guilty so now he or she always makes truthful 
promises because of a habit he or she has formed to avoid guilt. This person's truthful 
promises are based not on maxims that reflect reason, and thus the promise lacks moral 
worth. In order for actions to have moral worth, Kant says, 
We must be able to will that the maxim of our action become a 
universal law: this is the canon of moral appraisal of action in general. 
Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be 
thought without contradiction as a universal law, far less could one 
will that is shouldbecome such. (Kant, G 4:424) 
15 A false promise is made when one promises something knowing that one cannot, or have no intent, of 
delivering what has been promised. Whereas when one makes a true promise one does so with the intent of 
fulfilling the promise. 
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If one acts out of habit, then one is unaware of what he or she is willing. Therefore, 
whether or not this act coincides with the moral law it was not done for the sake of the 
moral law, and therefore it lacks moral virtue. However, this is not to say that habitual 
actions are determined. Although the agent may not be fully aware of what he or she is 
willing, one maintains the ability to will other than what one performs habitually. Thus, 
the ability to will, even a habitual action, is a result of one's choice or Willkiir. 
Moral, immoral, or habitual people are responsible for their actions because their 
actions fall under the moral law whether or not they are acting from the moral law. Finite 
rational agents cannot escape the moral law because they possess the ability to reason and 
reason is what gives rise to the moral law as a categorical imperative. Thus, because 
rational agents have a free will they are able to recognize the moral law which ought to 
governs their actions. However, because of the capacity of the will, which allows one to 
choose maxims either in accordance with the moral law or in contrast to the moral law, 
even immoral actions are free. Philosophers in Sidgwick's camp would strongly disagree 
with this interpretation. Sidgwick would maintain that if one's maxims are not formed for 
the sake of the moral law then laws of nature determine them. Thus, according to 
Sidgwick, Kant argues that people who possess the capacity to reason but do not act from 
reason are determined in their immoral actions, and from this interpretation, Sidgwick 
argues they cannot be held responsible. However, as we have seen throughout this 
chapter, if one has the capacity to exercise reason and does not, then one is not 
determined like an animal but merely cowardly or lazy. Enlightenment is a process that 
takes engagement and activity; one cannot sit back like a floating duck, for if one does 
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one is still responsible for the choice to do nothing. 
Conclusion 
Through looking at the themes; decision, responsibility, and habit in An Answer to 
a Question: What is Enlightenment?, and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
we have seen that choice (Willkiir) is implicit in these works. In What is Enlightenment? 
one's decision, or choice, is what allows one to embark on the enlightenment process. In 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant clearly states that the morally right 
decision can only be made for the right reason. Through one's ability to decide on an 
action comes responsibility for that action. Therefore, we do not hold animals responsible 
for their actions because they do not have the ability to reason options and make a 
decision; likewise, our expectations of children reflect their ability to choose between 
alternative options. 
In the section concerning duty we saw that it is not enough to possess the faculty 
of reason. Reason allows us to choose, but the faculty of reason also identifies which 
choices are in alliance with reason itself and which options are not. Thus, reason 
identifies or gives the rational or moral choice as well as identifies the non-moral options. 
In What is Enlightenment? Kant clearly sees people as having a duty or responsibility to 
act from their own reason. This responsibility precedes one actually acting from reason, 
in other words, when one is still in a state of self incurred minority 16• Kant says that one 
16 Children are in a state of minority that is not self-incurred because they do not yet possess the ability to 
reason. Thus, children are not held responsible to the same degree as adults, as they cannot yet recognize 
the moral law in its fullest capacity. However, adults that are still in a state of minority are in a state of self-
incurred minority. At some point people develop the capacity to reason and with this comes a higher level 
of responsibility. This is recognized in our society by implementing ages of majority on certain privileges, 
such as driving, voting, and drinking. Our courts take into account one's age when delivering verdicts. 
Minors receive different treatment than adults do. 
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has a duty or responsibility to strive to act as a rational being, or to strive to act from 
one's reason alone. This point is demonstrated in the first line of What is Enlightenment? 
when Kant refers to the state of minority as a self-incurred minority. 
However, as we learned in the Groundwork, reason does not dictate a single 
choice or maxim on which to base one's actions, but instead there can be many different 
maxims on which one can base one's actions. Some duties are imperfect and thus are 
greatly demand strong and accurate decision-making skills. The categorical imperative is 
universal and a priori however the maxims that represent this imperative are not explicit 
in this imperative. Therefore, rational agents must execute their faculty of reason and 
through doing so must execute their ability to choose, in order to act in accordance with 
the moral law. 
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational 
being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation 
of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since 
reason is required for the derivation of action from laws, the will is 
nothing other than practical reason. If reason infallibly determines 
the will. .. the will is a capacity to choose only that which reason 
independently of inclination cognizes as practically necessary, that 
is, as good. However. .. if the will is not in itself completely in 
conformity with reason (as is actually the case with human beings), 
then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are 
subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in 
conformity with objective laws is necessitation. (Kant, G 4:413) 
I will now in Chapter III tum to the second Critique, to look for evidence that Kant 
maintains that rational agents can freely choose to act against the moral law. 
74 
Chapter III 
The Greatest Good 
Introduction: 
In Chapter Two I have demonstrated that in An Answer to the Question; What is 
Enlightenment? and in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant has allowed 
rational agents the capacity to choose between different potential maxims. In both of the 
texts Kant maintains that people can freely choose to act against the moral law. I will 
continue to seek more evidence in the Critique of Practical Reason to reveal Kant's view 
that a finite rational agent's ability to act against the moral law. 
In the Critique of Practical Reason, we see the importance of two notions of 
practical freedom within Kant's moral philosophy. Allen Wood in Kant's Ethical 
Thought distinguishes between these two notions of freedom; 'negative freedom' and 
'positive freedom'. "In the "negative" sense, a will is practically free if it acts 
independently of external causes determining how it acts; in the "positive" sense, it is 
practically free if it has the power to determine itself in accordance with its own law 
(KrVA534/B562, G4:446, KpV5:33)." (Wood, 172) Although it is not always clear, in 
which sense freedom is being used or that in each instance freedom is being used in only 
one way, it is important not to ignore the different notions of freedom that Kant employs. 
Through Kant's examples 1, we see that rational agents are able or free to make decisions. 
For example, one can freely decide to either lie or tell the truth. What we must ask is 
1 Kant gives two very clear examples in Chapter One of the second Critique (Kant, CPracR 5:30), often 
referred to as the gallows examples. I will address each of these examples in detail in Section One of this 
chapter. 
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what does Kant mean when he says, "a free will and a will under moral law are one and 
the same"? (Kant 4:447) This statement can be interpreted in different ways. 
One could understand Kant to mean that only when one is acting autonomously is 
one a free and a responsible moral agent. When one is not acting in accordance with the 
moral law one is determined in the same capacity that an animal, which lacks reason, is 
determined2 • However, this explanation of Kant's philosophy is not consistent with the 
examples that Kant gives. Alternatively, when Kant says that 'one is free under the moral 
law' what Kant means is that only through recognizing the moral law is one free. 
Rational agents recognize their freedom when they recognize that they are under or ruled 
by the morallaw3. Section I of this chapter will examine how reason gives the moral law 
as the determining ground of the will independent from sensible conditions, which leads 
to the notion of freedom. 
The second section of this chapter will address Chapter III of the second Critique. 
Chapter III of the second Critique starts with a discussion on incentives. As we have 
seen, the moral worth of an action is often reduced to determining the incentive behind 
the action. As discussed previously, incentives have played a key role in determining 
whether an action has moral worth or not. Thus far we have seen that, if an action is 
performed for an empirical incentive then this action lacks moral worth. In this section of 
2 Allan Wood, in Kant's Ethical Thought states, "Like many early modem philosophers, Kant seems to 
have underestimated the mental (including volitional) capacities of nonhuman animals. It would often 
seem as though higher mammals do not always respond immediately to impulses but sometime deliberate, 
set ends, select means to them, even hesitate whether to pursue an end. But part of the problem is that it 
is inherently problematic to apply to nonhuman creatures any of the terms we have devised to designate 
the set of mental capacities we attribute to our self. Since our rational capacities are conceptualized both 
holistically and in relation to the entire normal range of human behavior." (Wood, 347) 
3 Kant maintains that freedom and the moral law are reciprocal concepts. See footnote three in Chapter I. 
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the second Critique Kant explains how the moral law itself acts as an incentive to 
perform morally good or worthy actions. The incentive that the moral law produces is 
called respect (or humility). Prior to the second Critique respect as an incentive to act in 
accordance with the moral law was not demonstrated explicitly. 
For Kant, respect is not an empirical feeling but it is a feeling we can know a 
pnon. Thus, although Kant allows for an incentive, he still maintains that one cannot let 
the phenomenal realm be the basis or interfere at all with determining the moral worth of 
a will. 
The final section of this paper will demonstrate in what sense rational agents 
acting against the moral law are free and in what sense they are not. In a section of the 
second Critique titled the 'Elucidation ofthe Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,' Kant 
explains why it is that pure practical reason is the only valid ground for the science of 
morals. In this section, Kant contrasts a doctrine ofhappiness with the doctrine of morals 
in order to demonstrate why it is that only the system presented in the analytic of pure 
practical reason produces morally worthy people. Kant explicitly discusses one's ability 
to act against the moral law. Through this section, in particular, Kant expresses his view 
that individuals have the ability to freely choose not to act morally, or autonomously. 
Through the discussion in Section III, it will become evident that it is a misinterpretation 
of Kant's ethics to claim 'when not following the moral law one is fully determined by 
the empirical'. For Kant, rational agents always exist in both the phenomenal realm and 
the noumenal realm. The laws that govern the phenomenal self are the laws of nature, 
while the law that governs the noumenal self is the moral law. When one's maxims are 
acted upon for the sake of the moral law they are autonomous agents, or self-governing. 
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However, when one's maxims do not reflect the moral law and are not acted upon for the 
sake of the moral law, the rational agent is said to be choosing to act in accordance with 
the laws of nature and, thus the agent is heteronomous4, or not self governing. When one 
acts from incentives or desires, one is not acting autonomously and thus one is not free in 
the positive sense. However, acting in this way does not impede one's ability to act in 
accordance with the moral law. In other words, what Kant means when he says 'one is 
determined by the laws of nature' is that a rational agent can choose this 'determination' 
and continually choose this. 
Section 1: Moral Law and Freedom 
The moral law cannot be proven through deduction, whether the attempt be made 
to deduce the law from theoretical reason, speculative reason or empirical enquiry. Thus, 
we can only know the moral law a priori, and never a posteriori. However, what can be 
deduced from the moral law, which is the faculty offreedom, has to be at least assumed 
possible in speculative reason. Therefore, the moral law, which itself"has no need of 
justifying grounds, proves not only the possibility but the reality in beings who cognize 
this law as binding upon them. The moral law, is in fact, a law of causality through 
freedom and hence a law of the possibility of a supersensible nature, just as the 
metaphysical law of events in the sensible world was a law of the causality of sensible 
nature." (Kant, CPracR 5:47) Thus, what speculative reason had to posit as an 
4 Lewis Beck, in A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, states, "Reason is thereby acting 
under one law which it has not itself prescribed; it chooses a law, prescribed as it were by nature to the 
person who has, as a matter of empirical fact, the goal which can be achieved by use of this theoretical 
knowledge ... A reason which is the slave of the passions, a will which follows the promptings of desire 
and chooses laws of nature as its guide in satisfying them, a principle or maxim whose content is the 
condition of an act of choice, and the imperative which directs this choice of a specific action- all of these 
can be called "heteronomous." (Beck, 102-3) 
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assumption, or a negative definition, the moral law is able to determine as a positive 
concept giving freedom objective reality. 
Kant says that our cognition of the unconditional practical must start from either 
the practical law or from freedom. However, in the second Critique Kant says it cannot 
start from freedom, because we cannot be immediately conscious of freedom. Kant states 
that our awareness of the moral law "cannot start from freedom, for we can neither be 
immediately conscious of this, since the first concept of it is negative, nor can we 
conclude it from experience, since experience lets us cognize only the law of appearances 
and hence the mechanism of nature, the direct opposite of freedom." (Kant, CPracR 5:30) 
Therefore, it is the practical law, or the moral law, that we become immediately aware of, 
"as soon as we draw up maxims ofthe will for ourselves5." (Kant, CPracR 5:30). 
Reason presents the moral law as a determining ground independent from sensible 
conditions, which leads to the notion of freedom, or more precisely freedom from the 
empirical, which is negative freedom. 
"But how is the consciousness of that moral law possible?" (Kant, CPracR 5:30) 
Kant says that consciousness of the moral law, which is a pure practical law, is possible 
in the same way that pure theoretical principles are possible. We become aware ofboth 
types of laws through the "necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and 
[through the] setting aside of all empirical conditions to which reason directs us." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:30) From pure practical law arises the concept of a pure will and from pure 
theoretical principles arises the consciousness of pure understanding. Therefore, the pure 
practical laws of morality give rise to the concept of a pure will, thus disclosing the 
5 I put this emphasis in this quote to stress there is an element of choice, or decision, in choosing a maxim 
on which to base one's actions. 
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concept of freedom. The laws of nature are not found in experience; however, experience 
supports the laws of nature, and thus, the laws of nature help to explain appearances, 
where as "nothing in appearances can be explained by the concept of freedom and there 
the mechanism of nature must instead constitute the only guide." (Kant, CPracR 5:30) 
The moral law with practical reason has forced the concept of freedom on us, "but 
experience also confirms this order of concepts in us." (Kant, CPracR 5:30) 
Kant gives us an example, to demonstrate through experience how it is that we 
know the concept of freedom through our morality. Kant asks us to conceive of a person 
who has such a strong lustful inclination that when the object he lusts for and the 
opportunity to pursue it are both present it is irresistible to him. Now suppose a gallows 
was erected where he finds this 'irresistible' opportunity and that he would be hanged 
immediately after satisfying his lust. Because it is irrational to want to be hanged, a 
rational man would be able to control his lust. This example clearly demonstrates that 
within Kant's moral framework one has the ability to choose whether one acts for the 
moral law or from empirical incentives. The lustful man in this example was not at the 
mercy of his desire; this individual could choose to act from reason or desire. If this man 
chooses to satisfy his lust, then he would not be autonomously free 6 never the less he was 
free in his decision because even while acting out his lust he could still choose to act in 
accordance with another maxim, one which represents the moral law. Because the lustful 
man, who possesses the power to reason, could choose to do other than what he is doing, 
he is negatively free from being determined. However, if he chooses not to act from his 
6 In this example, if the lustful man chooses not to satisfy his lust, then he does not automatically become 
autonomous. In order to be autonomous the maxim on which the act in question is based on must be done 
for the sake of the moral law. Therefore, if the man does not satisfy his lust because of his fear of being 
punished he is not autonomous. 
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own law of reason, and instead he chooses to act in accordance with another law, then he 
cannot be autonomously free. 
Kant now contrasts this example with another scenario. A prince demands that a 
person testifY falsely, which would result in the destruction of a honourable man whom 
the prince dislikes, or the consequence for not doing so is the gallows. In this situation, it 
is plausible that the man does not testify, or at least this scenario poses a more difficult 
answer than the previous example. Kant states, "He judges, therefore, that he can do 
something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, 
which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him." (Kant, CPracR 
5:30) This example, in contrast to the earlier example, shows that the examples are not 
meant to have the main character weigh the physical incentives and pick the most 
satisfying or rewarding option. Instead, we can see that Kant is demonstrating that one 
has the ability to choose to act either from an empirical incentive or from reason, and that 
the rational agent is not determined or destined to make either choice. 
These two examples clearly demonstrate that rational agents, whether or not they 
are acting rationally at the given time, have the ability to choose to do other than what 
they choose. For if this were not so, then introducing the gallows into these examples 
would be pointless. These examples demonstrate that rational agents have the ability to 
formulate maxims, some of which represent the moral law, others of which do not. 
Furthermore, rational agents have the ability to make decisions or choose between these 
maxims, and thus rational agents are free to choose to act against the moral law. 
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Wood discusses how it is that the opportunity arises for finite rational beings to 
choose between different potential maxims. This possibility is only present due to the 
type of will that finite rational beings must possess. Wood states, 
Kant conceives of two general kinds of will (or practical reason). A 
"holy will" necessarily follows rational principles, while a "finite" or 
"pathologically affected" will can fail to follow them and therefore 
must (at least sometimes) constrain itself to follow them (G 4:414). 
When addressed to a will of the later kind, a rational practical 
principle is called an imperative (G 4:413). Kant also famously 
distinguishes between two kinds of imperatives. Hypothetical 
imperatives presuppose an end already set and command an action as 
a means to an end. Their constraint of the will is therefore 
conditional on the agent's having set the end in question. 
Categorical imperatives are not dependent in this way; they require 
the performance of actions (and the setting of ends) without being 
conditional on any prior setting of an end. (Wood, Kant's Ethical 61) 
Thus, the people facing the gallows in the previous examples can either base their 
maxims on a hypothetical or a categorical imperative. If the people are swayed to act 
based on the threat of the gallows then these individuals are basing their acts on a maxim 
that is formulated on a hypothetical imperative. This is because the individual's actions 
are simply a means to a predetermined end not to be hung. However, if their actions are 
carried out for the sake of the moral law, then their maxims, which would not include any 
empirical incentive, would be based on a categorical imperative. Hence, if the individual 
did not lie on the King's request because he based his maxim of action on an imperative 
that it is always wrong to lie then this act is done for no other end than the moral law. 
In Section II, I address Kant's notion of the 'Good'. We see that Kant defines the 
good without relation to any empirical incentive, thus the good is based on the 
Categorical Imperative. Later in this section I will demonstrate what happens when 
empirical incentives are accepted into one's maxims. When maxims are based solely on 
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hypothetical imperatives then these maxims are evil. Through this discussion we see that 
finite rational beings are able to choose good or evil. 
Section II: Interests and Incentives 
In Chapter II of the second Critique Kant addresses 'The Concept of an Object of 
Pure Practical Reason.' Here Kant demonstrates how to distinguish between actions that 
are done from reason and actions that are done for empirical incentives. Kant states that 
he is able to avoid the error of past philosophers, with regard to moral philosophy, 
through naming the object of the moral law a priori. According to John Silber, in "The 
Copernican Revolution in Ethics: The Good Re-examined", "Kant's predecessors 
generally believed that ethical enquiry should begin with the definition of the good from 
which the moral law and the concept of obligation are to be derived." (Silber, 196) For 
example, virtue ethicists focus on how to make people better or more virtuous, while 
utilitarian ethicists focus on producing happiness. Kant asserts that past philosophers 
have "sought an object of the will in order to make it into the matter and the ground of the 
law ... whereas they should have first searched for a law that determined the will a priori 
and immediately, and only then determined the object conformable to the will." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:64) Thus, past philosophers have identified the determining ground of the will 
with reference to objects of pleasure and displeasure. This in tum led other philosophers 
to base their moral law on empirical conditions, which leads to a heteronomous exception 
of rational agentcy. Kant has avoided this problem by determining the object of the 
moral law through the moral law, and without reference to empirical conditions. Silber 
explains, 
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[If] a will is related to an object in such a way that it is determined 
by the object ... [then] the will is conditioned by that object. But 
the will cannot be free and responsible unless it is unconditioned, 
capable of acting apart from external determination by an object. 
Hence if the good as the object of the will is related to the will in this 
fashion it is indeed related by law and with necessity, but it is not 
related to the will of a moral person. For in being related to the 
subject as its causal determinant, the good destroys the freedom of 
the subject, and hence the subject is no longer a moral person. If, on 
the other hand, the will is related to the good as its object in such a 
way as to retain its power to act undetermined by that object, then 
the freedom and moral significance of the will as well as its 
relatedness to the good can be maintained. (Silber, "The Copernican 
Revolution" 202) 
As I have already established, Kant's system of ethics holds that the will is 
undetermined and thus free. Silber highlights the alternative to Kant's system in the 
above quote. Silber maintains that the alternative would be to have the will determined 
by the object. This in tum would lead to a will that cannot be free and thus cannot be 
responsible as it would not be capable of acting without determination by empirical 
incentives. Such a will is not capable of choosing maxims on which to base actions that 
are distinct from empirical ends. Although Kant's system allows for a will that can be 
undetermined by empirical objects it does not necessitate that this is so. It is possible 
for a finite rational being's will to be undetermined however it is also conceivable, 
within Kant's system, that an individual forms a maxim which includes an empirical 
incentive and then chooses this maxim. Thus an agent who possesses a free will can 
allow for his or her will, or choose that his or her will, be determined by the laws of 
nature. However, as demonstrated in the previous gallows examples, an individual has 
the ability to choose otherwise or base one's maxims on the categorical imperative 
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rather than hypothetical imperatives, thus leaving one's will unconditioned and free 
regardless of choices actually made. 
For Kant the only objects of a practical reason are those that are good and those 
which are evil. Good and evil must only be arrived at through reason and never 
empirical conditions; thus good and evil are not what is 'good or bad for me' as in well-
being or ill-being. For Kant, good and evil are not defined in terms of sensibility or our 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Good and evil are universally communicated through 
reason. "Good [is] that which is a means to the agreeable, and evil that which is a cause 
of disagreeableness and of pain, for appraisal of the relation of means to ends certainly 
belongs to reason." (Kant, CPracR 5:59) Therefore, good and evil are actions (or 
means) not to a person's feeling, but to one's way of acting. Good and evil are in 
reference to the actions and thus the maxims that a person adheres to, and therefore a 
person himself is good or evil depending on which maxims one chooses to follow. 
Thus, for Kant good and evil are in the act, while for other philosophers (virtue and 
utilitarian ethicists) good and evil are determined by the end or the result of the act. 
Kant says, "What we are to call good must be an object of the faculty of desire in 
the judgment of every reasonable human being, and evil an object of aversion in the 
eyes of everyone; hence for this appraisal reason is needed, in addition to sense." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:61) However, desire and aversion are not meant to imply that happiness is 
the only thing that matters. Humans are in both the world of the sensible and in the 
world of the understanding. Because humans are in the world of the sensible they have 
empirical needs. However, humans differ from animals in that humans are not 
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indifferent to reason and therefore humans cannot use reason merely as a tool for 
satisfying their own needs as a sensible being. Kant states, 
For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in worth above mere 
animality if reason is to serve him only for the sake of what instinct 
accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only a 
particular mode nature had used to equip the human being for the 
same end to which it has destined animals, without destining him to 
a higher good. (Kant, CPracR 5:61-2) 
It is important to understand the difference between the way in which one would 
usually use the term good and how Kant uses the term good. Kant uses the term "good" 
as an absolute good. For example, let us suppose that a finite rational agent holds it is 
good to tell the truth so he or she does not get in trouble later. In this case 'good' is not 
an absolute good because it is dependent on empirical (prudential) criteria. "Kant 
thinks, that we do not make a man good by making him happy. Nor do we live in so 
blessed a world that we can fail to see men brought to ruin as a direct result of their 
fidelity to duty." (Silber, "The Copernican Revolution" 205) However, if one holds 
truth telling as a good because one respects the authority of the moral law, then this is 
an absolute good; as it can be identified as a good a priori to any situation. Kant 
addresses the distinction between the different uses of the term good (and evil) when he 
answers the question, "What is good and evil in itself?" If we presuppose an object of 
pleasure or displeasure, thus something that gratifies or pains, then the "determining 
ground of the faculty of desire precedes the maxim of the will." (Kant, CPracR 5:62) 
Therefore, the maxims of reason that are used to pursue gratitude or avoid pain are done 
so in reference to inclination and thus are only done for the consequence or end. "Such 
maxims can never be laws but can still be called rational practical precepts. The end or 
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good that is sought in this case is not absolute good ... but merely well-being. The will 
whose maxim is affected by pleasure and displeasure is not a pure will. A pure will is 
directed only to that which pure reason can ofitselfbe practical." (Kant, CPracR 5:620) 
An absolute good is 'something' that is good in itself. This occurs when, 
A rational principle is already thought as in itself the determining 
ground of the will without regard to possible objects of the faculty of 
desire (hence through their mere lawful form of the maxim), in 
which case that principle is a practical law a priori and pure reason is 
taken to be practical of itself. In that case the law determines the 
will immediately, the action in conformity with it is in itself good, 
and a will who's maxim who always conforms with this law is good 
absolutely, good in every respect and the supreme condition of all 
good. (Kant, CPracR 5:62) 
If we start with a conception of the good and derive the laws of the will from this, then 
objects of desire determine the will. This leads to a subjective and situational 
conception of what is moral. Therefore, "the concept of good and evil must not be 
determined before the moral law ... but only ... after it and by means of it." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:62) Only a formal law can be an a priori determining ground of practical 
reason, because it lacks content that would otherwise be obtained through empirical 
interest. The formal law only prescribes to reason the "form of its universal lawgiving 
as the supreme condition of maxims." (Kant, CPracR 5:64) 
Although Kant's system of ethics holds that the good is known a priori, and thus 
the good of an action is in the act itself and not simply in the end, it does not rule out the 
possibility of a person acting as if the good is in the end of the act, or heteronomously. 
In other words, a finite rational being can perform an action strictly for an end, or to 
fulfill an empirical incentive; however, for Kant the good of an action can never be 
obtained this way. What determines the will for Kant is prior to action. Before one acts 
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one must choose a maxim on which to act. It is the choice (or execution of Willkiir) that 
determines the moral worth of a will, and not an empirical incentive. 
Virtue ethicists focus on how to make people better or more virtuous. Utilitarian 
ethicists focus on producing happiness. Both of these types of ethicists base their 
'moral law' on empirical conditions. Systems such as these motivate rational agents to 
act morally through empirical rewards for doing so. Thus, the good in these systems is 
something empirical, such as wealth. The question for Kantian ethicists is, what moves 
one to act morally if morally good acts do not incorporate empirical interests or 
incentives? 
I have demonstrated that Kant's Groundwork finds it more worthy for rational 
agents to act from their reason without allowing the phenomenal realm, which includes 
their feelings, to impact their will. Thomas Hill, in Human Welfare and Moral Worth, 
states that it is "Kant's idea that we are most fully self-regulating and free when we 
willingly act from respect for the moral law without ulterior motives." (Hill, 31 0) 
However, Kant does introduce an incentive that if acted upon still produces a morally 
worthy action and a feeling to go along with morally worthy actions. The incentive to 
act morally is the moral law itself. Kant says, "it is even hazardous to let any other 
incentive (such as that of advantage) so much as cooperate alongside the moral law." 
(Kant, CPracR 5:72) But, what does it mean to hold the moral law as the incentive to 
act? Kant says that through choosing the moral law as the incentive to act and thus 
discounting all empirical incentives, will produce a feeling of pain. "Here we have the 
first and perhaps the only case in which we can determine a priori from concepts the 
relation of a cognition ... to the feeling of pleasure or pain." (Kant, CPracR 5:73) The 
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feeling of pain or humiliation comes from striking down self-conceit, however at the 
same time the moral law is regarded as an object of respect. Kant says "the ground of a 
positive feeling that is not of empirical origin and is cognized a priori. Consequently, 
respect for the moral law is a feeling that is produced by an intellectual ground." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:73) 
It has been said repeatedly that in order for an action to be morally worthy the 
will must be determined by pure practical reason without being determined by any 
empirical incentives. This being said, Kant is not contradicting his previous claim when 
he now says, "the moral law ... is also a subjective determining ground- that is, an 
incentive - to this action inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject 
and effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the law upon the will." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:75) This is consistent with his earlier comments regarding the determining 
ground of the will because the 'feeling' or incentive to act in accordance with the moral 
law, is respect and respect for the moral law is known a priori. Thus, the incentive of 
respect, although Kant calls it a subjective determining ground and a feeling, is very 
different than any other feeling or incentive. Kant clarifies this when he explains 
respect in this way: 
Respect for the law is not the incentive to morality; instead it is 
morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive inasmuch as 
pure practical reason, by rejecting all the claims of self-love in 
opposition with its own, supplies authority to the law, which now 
alone has influence. (Kant, CPracR 5:76) 
As mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, a divine will always follows the 
moral law in spirit and never merely by the letter of the law. This is because empirical 
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incentives, like happiness, can never be a determining ground for a divine will7• 
However, Kant states that "respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being 
[that is a divine being] or even to one free from all sensibility." (Kant, CPracR 5:76) 
Pure rational beings have divine wills; therefore, they need no incentive to act for the 
spirit of the law, for if they did then they would not be purely rational and thus they 
would not be divine. Pure rational beings are not capable of acting except for the sake 
of the law. Kant says, "the feeling (under the name of moral feeling) ... does not serve 
for appraising actions and certainly not for grounding the objective moral law itselfbut 
only as an incentive to make this law its maxim." (Kant, CPracR 5:76) It does not 
make sense to discuss the need for an incentive to do something that one cannot avoid 
doing. The divine will cannot avoid acting autonomously, therefore it cannot have 
incentives, other than respect and humility, on which to act. 
Not only can one have respect for the moral law but one can also have mediated 
respect for other rational beings. In the Groundwork Kant formulated the moral law in 
several different ways. One of those ways was the formulation of the end in itself, 
which requires that we always treat others as ends in themselves. In others words, it is 
wrong to treat a person simply as a means. For example, one should not rescue a person 
7 If the moral law is followed for some incentive other than respect, like a feeling of happiness, then the 
action is not performed for the sake, or spirit of the law and it merely contains legality but not morality. 
An action contains legality when it is done by the letter of the law, and morality when it is done for the 
sake or spirit of the law. However, a divine will cannot regard a distinction between legality and 
morality. A divine will is not affected by empirical incentives, therefore it cannot have a subjective 
determining ground, thus a divine will always follows the spirit of the moral law. On the other extreme, a 
beast can only act on a subjective determining ground, thus it cannot follow the spirit of the law. Rational 
beings, such as humans, fall with one foot on either side of the distinction between the divine and the 
beast. This is because, the rational being has a noumenal self and a phenomenal self and thus a rational 
agent sees oneself as a free agent, which can act for either the moral law or empirical incentives. 
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for the honour of being recognized as a hero. Instead, one should rescue a person 
because the moral law dictates that this is the right thing to do. In Chapter Two of the 
second Critique Kant expands on why this is true. Kant maintains that, "Respect is 
always directed only to persons," (Kant, CPracR 5:77) This is because a person who is 
acting in a morally good way demonstrates the moral law and respect can only be 
accessed through an a priori feeling with regard to the moral law. Respect can never be 
attained through mere empirical assessment, nor does respect need to be earned. Both 
Hill and Wood stress that respect for others need not be earned because it is simply 
owed to rational beings. Wood states, 
Because respect for the dignity of humanity is identical with the 
respect for law grounding morality in general, to demand that others 
earn it (or any part of it) is in effect to hold that our obligations to 
others rest (are least in part) on their distinctive excellences rather 
than fully and unconditionally on their humanity. To require that 
respect be earned is to hold that people are to be respected in part for 
what distinguishes them from others; it thereby places respect 
squarely within the comparative-competitive conception of self-
worth. Kant not only regards all such concepts of self-worth as 
distinct from a moral conception of it, but ... it is not exaggeration 
to say that Kant even regards them as the sole and exclusive ground 
of all moral evil. (Wood, Kant's Ethical135) 
One can admire and act based on admiration, but this incentive is merely empirical. It 
will not lead to acts performed for the spirit of the law, meaning morally worthy acts. 
In other words, one can admire someone for having a skill, like juggling, or one can 
revere nature, however these types of feelings are distinct from that of respect. "This 
respect, then, which we show to such a person ... is not mere admiration." (Kant, 
CPracR 5:78) Kant summarizes what we should take away from this section, 
Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also the 
undoubted moral incentive, and this feeling is also directed to no 
object except on this basis. First, the moral law determines the will 
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objectively and immediately in the judgment of reason; but freedom 
the causality of which is determined only through the law, consists 
just in this: that it restrict all inclinations, and consequently the 
esteem of the person himself, to the condition of compliance with its 
pure law. This restriction now has an effect on feeling and produces 
the feeling of displeasure which can be cognized a priori from the 
moral law ... personal worth ... in the absence of agreement with the 
moral law, is reduced to nothing ... [and therefore] humiliation 
takes place only relatively to the purity of the law ... (Kant, CPracR 
5:79) 
Thus far in this section I have demonstrated the incentive that Kant claims 
motivates one to act for the sake of the moral law. This non empirical incentive, or 
feeling, is respect and respect can also be held towards people. 
I am not particularly concerned with the actuality of those free actions that are 
done for the sake, or respect, of the moral law, because for the purpose of this thesis I 
have presupposed that these acts are free. I am concerned with what the concept of 
incentive gives rise to, which is interest. Kant explains it in this way, 
From the concept of an incentive arises that of an interest; which can 
never be attributed to any being unless it has reason ... since in a 
morally good will the law itself must be the incentive, the moral 
interest is a pure sense-free interest of practical reason alone. On the 
concept of an interest is based that of a maxim. A maxim is therefore 
morally genuine only if it rests solely on the interest one takes in 
compliance with the law. AU three concepts, however- that of an 
incentive, of an interest and of a maxim- can be applied only to finite 
beings. For they all presuppose a limitation of the nature of a being, 
in that the subjective constitution of its choice does not of itself 
accord with the objective law of a practical reason; they presuppose 
a need to be impelled to activity by something because an internal 
obstacle is opposed to it. Thus they cannot be applied to the divine 
will. (Kant, CPracR 5:79) 
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Above, Kant says that the concepts of incentive, interest and maxim can only be applied 
to finite beings possessing reason8. Therefore, humans, as rational beings, must have 
interests not only in the moral law, but as well as empirical incentives. Rational beings 
have interests and therefore incentives to their actions. An incentive to act is based on a 
maxim, and thus, maxims include incentives. These incentives must arise from one of 
two types of interest, either moral-interest or empirical interests. A divine being, that is 
a divine will, cannot have interests. A divine will is necessarily in accordance with the 
supreme law or moral law. However, a finite rational being must choose a maxim to act 
on based on an incentive that arises from her or his interest. Therefore, a rational agent 
is capable of formulating different potential maxims based on different types of 
incentives that represent different interests. Above, there is no reason given to believe 
that for Kant the ability to formulate and choose maxims, while being aware of the 
incentives and interests that they represent, are determined acts. In fact, formulating 
and choosing between maxims is the very ability that demonstrates to us that finite 
rational beings are capable of (freely) choosing a heteronomous maxim, on which to act. 
It is because humans are finite that we have a duty, and duty implies that we can do 
other than what the duty requires. Hill says in relation to Kant's ethics, that rational 
agents can fulfil their duties to the categorical imperative, or the moral law, but may 
choose not to. Furthermore, although rational agents can have empirical 
8 There is a distinction between possessing reason and acting rationally. To possess reason is to have the 
capacity to act rationally, where as when one acts rationally they are expressing this capacity. For 
example, although I possess sight this does not mean that I see what is around me, as I might be sleeping. 
For a discussion on the distinction between possessing reason and acting on reason, refer back to the 
introduction of this thesis. 
93 
incentives, they can choose not to act for an empirical incentive; thus rational agents 
cannot be completely enslaved by empirical incentives. Hill states 
Since being under an imperative implies the possibility of acting 
against reason, agents subject to categorical imperatives may in fact 
fail to follow them, and may even act against them; but insofar as we 
suppose the agents ought to follow the imperatives, we must assume 
that they can. Already it is clear, then, that agents subject to 
categorical imperatives cannot be complete slaves to the impulses and 
desires of the moment, for that implies inability to regulate conduct by 
rational reflection, even about future consequences to oneself. (Hill, 
Human Welfare 32) 
Rational agents have a duty to the moral law yet they are not determined to follow the 
law. Likewise, rational agents can act on empirical incentives yet they can exercise 
their reason to avoid doing so. This is only true of rational agents that exist both in the 
phenomenal realm and in the noumenal realm; thus this is not true for pure rational 
beings who (would) only exist in the noumenal realm. Such perfect beings have a 
different will to that of a finite rational being. As Kant states, 
The moral law is ... for the will of a perfect being a law of holiness, 
but for the will of every finite rational being a law of duty ... Duty 
and what is owed are the only names that we must give to our relation 
to the moral law. We are indeed lawgiving members of a kingdom of 
moral possibility through freedom and represented to us by practical 
reason for our respect; but we are at the same time subjects in it. 
(Kant, CPracR 5:82-3) 
Our freedom as finite rational beings comes through co-existing both in the noumenal 
realm and the phenomenal realm. Rational agents have both a noumenal self whose 
incentive is respect for the moral law and a phenomenal self whose incentive is self 
preservation or happiness. This duality, which the divine and the beast both lack, is 
what gives us the ability to make choices, it gives us our freedom. Hill states, 
Kant argues that to attribute to moral agents the sort of freedom of 
the will that morality requires we must think of them as belonging to 
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an 'intelligible world' as well as the 'sensible world.' The idea of 
responsible choice employed in practical discussions cannot be 
reduced to or fully explained by empirical phenomena: a fact that is 
marked by saying that wills are noumenal, in contrast with what is 
known through experience (the phenomenal). Autonomous wills 
cannot be known as substances in space and time, subject to 
empirical causal laws. We can 'think' but not 'comprehend' their 
existence as 'causes' of a nonempirical kind. (Hill, Human Welfare 
35-6) 
The ability to choose allows rational beings the freedom to choose to act immorally. 
Kant says, "he can never be altogether free from desires and inclinations which, because 
they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves accord with the moral law ... " (Kant, 
CPracR 5:84) and that "Duty ... holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind 
and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all 
inclinations are dumb ... "(Kant, CPracR 5:86) Finite rational beings have a moral law 
to which they are bound through duty. However, empirical incentives arise that 
interfere with one's duty to the moral law. This is not to say that one is determined by 
either duty or empirical incentives. As Kant tells us in the above quote one can revere 
the moral law, yet choose to disobey the moral law. 
Finite rational beings freely choose between empirical and the moral incentive 
yet if they choose the moral incentive they are more free because they are self 
governing. Because a rational agent's reason does not itself legislate the laws of nature 
to itself a rational agent cannot be free in the autonomous sense when acting for the 
laws of nature. However, we cannot say that while acting from empirical incentives one 
is acting free from the moral law, as a rational agent. Finite rational beings still have 
the ability or faculty to reason and thus are still subject to the moral law even when not 
acting for the moral law. Hill states, 
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Even when acting 'from' inclinations, then we are seen as acting on 
maxims, i.e., choosing (when one might do otherwise) to adopt and 
follow the policy of doing what satisfies such inclinations in the sort 
of context at hand. Greedy acts, then, are not to be understood as 
behaviours causally necessitated by a strong inner force, but rather as 
reflections of an agent's at least temporary commitment to a policy 
of satisfying his urge even at others expense. (Hill, Human Welfare 
317) 
Section III: Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason 
For Kant, the analytic of pure practical reason is a science. Therefore, the 
Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason is the investigation and 
justification as to why this science, and no similar science with a different systematic 
form, will serve as the basis for morality. "Practical reason has at its basis the same 
cognitive faculty as does speculative reason so far as both are pure reason. Therefore 
the difference in the systematic form of the one from that of the other must be 
determined by a comparison of the two, and the ground of this difference must be 
assigned." (Kant, CPracR 5:89) Through the comparison that follows, I will 
demonstrate that, as in all of Kant's previous texts, moral maxims cannot include 
empirical incentives; however, this section highlights how one can indeed (freely) 
choose to incorporate empirical incentives into one's maxims and thus choose to act 
immorally. 
This section in Kant's moral theory remains consistent with what we have seen 
in Kant's earlier texts. Kant says, 
Anything empirical that might slip into our maxims as a determining 
ground of the will makes itself known at once by the feeling of 
gratification or pain that necessarily attaches to it insofar as it 
arouses desire, whereas pure practical reason directly opposes taking 
this feeling into its principle as a condition. The dissimilarity of 
96 
determining grounds (empirical and rational) is made known by this 
resistance of a practically lawgiving reason to every meddling 
inclination. (Kant, CPracR 5:92) 
Thus, although duty to the moral law excludes empirical inclinations from being 
incorporated into a moral maxim, rational finite beings can still allow incentives to 
influence their maxims. If a maxim is based on a rational determining ground it is 
necessarily moral and if it is based on an empirical determining ground the maxim has 
no moral worth, and thus is evil. But the question that is of interest is whether these 
maxims which lack moral worth, or evil maxims, are determined, and thus necessary. 
Kant tells us that, "no one, not even the most common human understanding, can fail to 
see at once, in an example presented to him, that he can indeed be advised by empirical 
grounds of volition to follow their charms but that he can never be expected to obey 
anything but the pure practical law of reason alone." (Kant, CPracR 5:92) I conclude 
from this that if one cannot so much as be expected to obey empirical incentives they 
certainly cannot be determined to, or be legislated necessarily, to act on these 
incentives. Thus, when one acts on maxims that do not represent the moral law one is 
free while doing so. This being said, an empirical determining ground for the will 
(principle of happiness) and a rational determining ground for the will (principle of 
morality) are not in direct opposition to one another. Kant states, 
The distinction of the principle of happiness from that of morality is 
not ... an opposition between them, and pure practical reason does 
not require that one should renounce claims to happiness but only that 
as soon as duty is in question one should take no account of them. It 
can even in certain respects be a duty to attend to one's happiness, 
partly because happiness (to which belong skill, health, wealth) 
contains means for the fulfillment of one's duty and partly because 
lack of it (e.g. poverty) contains temptation to transgress one's duty. 
(Kant, CPracR 5:93) 
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It is important to pay close attention to whether the discussion on freedom is about 
maxims or actions9. For Kant practical freedom can be identified as the "independence 
of the will from anything other than moral law alone." (Kant, CPracR 5:94) This being 
said there is no insight into the possibility of freedom as an efficient cause, particularly 
in the sensible world. However, this is not a problem so long as we can be "sufficiently 
assured that there is no proof of its impossibility, and are now forced to assume it and 
are thereby justified in doing so by the moral law, which postulates it." (Kant, CPracR 
5:94) Causality of natural necessity is distinct from the causality of freedom. The 
causality of natural necessity is only concerned with the existence of things as they are 
determinable in time, and thus as appearances, whereas the causality of freedom is 
concerned with their causality as things in themselves. "Now, if one takes the 
determinations of existence of things in time for determinations of things in themselves 
(which is the most usual way of representing them), then the necessity in the causal 
relation can in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as 
contradictory." (Kant, CPracR 5:95) Every act takes place in time, which necessarily 
follows an earlier point in time. Because the past is no longer in one's control every 
action must have a determining ground that is out of one's control. 
9 In a section of the second Critique titled, "The Typic of Pure Practical Judgment" Kant addresses the 
difficulty is discussing morally good actions. Kant states, "All cases of possible actions that occur can be 
only empirical, that is, belong to experience and nature; hence, it seems absurd to want to find in the 
sensible world a case which, though as such it stands only under the law of nature, yet admits of the 
application to it of a law of freedom and to which there could be applied the supersensible idea of the 
morally good, which is to be exhibited in it in concreto . .. The morally good as an object is something 
supersensible,so that nothing corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition." (Kant, CPracR 
5:68) However Kant says, 'To decide whether or not something is an object of pure practical reason [i.e. 
the moral law] is only to discern the possibility of willing the action." (Kant, CPracR 5:68) 
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Actions as they exist in time, or anything that exists in time including the acting 
agent, cannot escape the law of natural necessity; the existence of things in time is 
determined 10• Kant says, 
If, then, one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is 
determined in time, one cannot, so far at least, except this being from 
the law of natural necessity as to all events in its existence and 
consequently as to its actions as well ... But since this law 
unavoidably concerns all causality of things so far as they exist in 
time is determinable, if this were the way in which one had to 
represent also the existence of these things in themselves then 
freedom would have to be rejected as null and impossible concept. 
(Kant, CPracR 5:95) 
Kant recognizes that finite rational beings are determined in relation to time (and space). 
Rational finite beings are only determined in that they exist in time, that is as beings 
who have a phenomenal self existence in every sequential moment. Therefore, the 
status of an action whether it be moral or immoral is determined in time. It is the 
maxim on which the action is based that we can discuss as free or not 11 • Actions 
always exist in the phenomenal realm and thus are always determined in time; however, 
maxims are formulated in the noumenal realm and thus not in time. This leads us to the 
same question that Kant posed, 
If I say of a human being who commits a theft that this deed is, in 
accordance with the natural law of causality, a necessary result of 
determining grounds in preceding time, then it was impossible that it 
could have been left undone; how, then, can appraisal in accordance 
with the moral law make any change in it and suppose that it could 
have been omitted because the law says that it ought to have been 
omitted? That is, how can that man be called quite free at the same 
point of time and in regard to the same action in which and in regard 
to which he is nevertheless subject to a an unavoidable natural 
necessity? (Kant 5:96) 
10 Refer back to the discussion on the Third Antinomy found in footnote one in the introduction to this 
thesis. 
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All actions are in accordance 'with the natural law of causality.' The natural law of 
causality is such that actions must precede actions and follow actions in time. This law 
is in no relation to what specific actions occur; it is merely saying that actions cannot 
cease but only change. In the case of finite rational agents, such as the thief, maxims 
are expressed by action in time. The relationship between maxims and actions is such 
that no specific action is determined by the action that comes before it. Instead, what 
specific action takes place is a result of the maxim, which has been chosen. A thief is 
unlike a mechanical object such as a clock or an arrow in important respects. After a 
clock is wound, it will continue to tick until it uses up the energy stored by winding it. 
Watches are different from finite rational beings as watches cannot create new maxims 
or choose maxims on which to base its actions. Comparative freedom is like that of a 
clock that ticks without external input, or a projectile that after being released continues 
to move without being aided externally. Both the clock and the projectile have an initial 
cause that keeps them going, but after they start, they cannot be altered in any way 
because they have no self-determination. This is unlike the thief who can alter his path, 
because he is self-determined. The thief is determined in that his actions must precede 
his previous actions in time. Yet, his intelligible character exists in the noumenal realm 
and thus he can choose his maxims on which to base his actions; therefore he can 
choose an alternative to stealing even while in the process of stealing. Kant says, "In 
the same way the actions of the human being, although they are necessary by their 
determining grounds which preceded them in time, are yet called free because the 
actions are caused from within, by representations produced by our own powers, 
100 
whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances and hence action are 
produced at our own discretion." (Kant, CPracR 5:96) 
Rational agents not only exist in the phenomenal realm they also exist in the 
noumenal realm. Each rational agent has a self that does not exist in time as well as a 
body that does exist in time. The thief can control his or her actions depending on 
which maxim he or she chooses to base his or her actions on, because the thief is self 
determined. Thus, we know that a finite rational being's actions are caused 
sequentially by the mechanism of nature, but this is not to say that the rational agent is 
solely determined by the mechanisms of nature. Kant says: 
One looks only to the necessity of the connection of events in a time 
series as it develops in accordance with natural law ... But the very 
same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing 
in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under 
conditions of time and himself only as determinable only through laws 
that he gives himself by reason. (Kant, CPracR 5:97-8) 
Therefore, as we have seen, the thief in Kant's previous example can avoid 
committing the theft. This is because the thief exits in both the phenomenal and 
noumenal realm and although the thief s actions necessarily exist in the sequence of 
time, his existence in the noumenal realm allows him freedom to formulate maxims on 
which to base his actions. Kant states, 
So consider, a rational being can now rightly say of every unlawful 
action he performed that he could have omitted it even though as 
appearance it is sufficiently determined in the past and, so far, is 
inevitably necessary; for this action, with all the past which 
detennines it, belongs to a single phenomenon of his character, which 
he gives to himself and in accordance with which he imputes to 
himself, as a cause independent of all sensibility, the causality of those 
appearances. (Kant, CPracR 5:98) 
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Through the ability to recognize wrongdoing, it is evident that one can freely choose 
which maxim to base one's actions upon. If rational agents can freely choose the 
maxim on which to base their actions then they must be responsible for those actions. 
Independent of one's environment or upbringing a thief must always be responsible for 
his or her wrongdoing. As Kant says, "They (wicked children turned wicked adults 12 ) 
remained as accountable as any other human being. This could not happen if we did not 
suppose that whatever arises from one's choice (as every action intentionally performed 
undoubtedly does) has at its basis a free causality ... " (Kant, CPracR 5:100) In this 
quote Kant explicitly draws a connection between one's choice and intentional actions. 
Therefore, we clearly see that Kant believes, even though the noumenal self is the free 
self, that the noumenal self can instruct the phenomenal self to perform certain actions. 
Thus making the phenomenal self determined not solely by the empirical but also by the 
noumenal self's free causality. This shows that finite rational beings can freely act 
against the moral law. This in tum demonstrates how it is that immoral, or wicked, 
adults can be held responsible for all of their actions. 
Conclusion 
Through examining the second Critique we can see that Kant believes that 
rational finite beings can freely choose to act against the moral law. In Section I of this 
chapter on the Moral Law and Freedom, through the gallows examples, we saw that the 
lustful man was not at the mercy of his desire; this individual could choose to act from 
12 Refer back to Section I in Chapter II, which deals with the responsibility tha.t a minor has to become 
enlightened. · 
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reason or desire. Therefore, this individual could choose to act for the sake of the moral 
law or could choose to act against the moral law. 
In Section II of this chapter, Interests and Incentives, I have shown how Kant 
derives the Good, how the feeling of respect is an incentive to act in accordance with 
the moral law, and how empirical incentives can be incorporated into one's maxims. 
Through this discussion we have seen that finite rational beings can freely choose 
between empirical and moral incentives. However, if they choose the moral incentive 
they are more free because they are self governing, or autonomous. Nonetheless, a 
rational agent who chooses to act from empirical incentives is still free. A rational 
agent who chooses to act from empirical incentives still has the faculty of reason and 
thus although one is not acting fully autonomously one is still free in some sense. 
Finally, in Section III of this paper I examined a section ofthe second Critique 
titled the "Elucidation ofthe Analytic of Pure Practical Reason." In this section, Kant 
explains how it is that a finite rational being's actions can be determined empirically, 
yet that same rational agent has the freedom to perform different actions. This is 
because finite rational beings exist both in the phenomenal realm and in the noumenal 
realm. In the phenomenal realm, rational agents are determined in time, as there is 
necessarily a sequence of events that precedes their actions. However, a rational agent's 
existence in the noumenal realm allows one freedom to formulate maxims on which to 
base one's actions. Thus, rational agents can freely choose to formulate maxims that are 
not for the sake of the moral law and then act on them. This then is to say, in regard to 
immoral acts, that one could have acted other than one did. Therefore, within the 
second Critique there is ample evidence that Kant believed that finite rational beings 
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can freely choose to act against the moral law, and thus must be held responsible for 
their immoral actions. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen that throughout the texts of Kant's practical philosophy that we 
have examined Kant has maintained that finite rational agents are free to formulate and 
choose maxims that are n~t for the sake of the moral law. Thus, finite rational agents can 
freely choose against the moral law. There is little or no debate that Kant explicates this 
in his later moral philosophy. His later moral philosophy consists of the Religion Within 
the Bounds of Reason Alone and the Metaphysics of Morals. However, as we have seen, 
there is much dispute concerning whether or not Kant maintained that finite rational 
agents are free to choose against the moral law in his early moral philosophy. His early 
moral philosophy consists of An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment, the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and the Critique of Practical Reason. 
Section 1: Overview 
In Chapter I, I introduce Kant's notions of Wille and Willkiir. Through the 
distinction and the relationship between these terms, we understand how it is that Kant 
explains a finite rational agent's ability to choose to act against the moral law. Wille in 
the wide sense consists of both Wille (in the narrow sense) and Willkiir (or choice). Wille 
in the narrow sense is the legislative function of the will, and Willkiir is the executive 
function of the will. Wille is the source of the categorical imperative, and is thus equated 
to practical reason. Willkiir is confronted by the laws given to it by Wille. Willkiir is to 
choose and decide while always under the governance of Wille. (Allison, Kant's Theory 
130) Thus, laws come from the narrow Wille, while maxims from Willkiir. Therefore, 
finite rational beings are always under the moral law even when they choose not to obey 
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the law. Therefore even when acting immorally, finite rational agents can choose to do 
other than what they are doing. Thus, finite rational agents are not determined by 
empirical incentives when acting on maxims that do not represent the moral law. Kant 
says, "Human choice . . . is a choice that can indeed be affected but is not determined by 
impulses, and is therefore of itself ... not pure but can still be determined to action by 
pure will. Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible 
impulses." (Kant, MM 6:214) 
Thus, after explaining why it is that there is little or no debate concerning how 
one can choose against the moral law in Kant's later moral philosophy I tum my attention 
to Kant's earlier moral philosophy. I demonstrate that it is implicit in Kant's early moral 
philosophy that finite rational agents can freely choose against the moral law. 
In chapter II, I look for evidence in What is Enlightenment? and in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals that Kant employs the idea that finite rational 
agents are free when they choose to act against the moral law. The main themes in this 
chapter are decision, responsibility, and habit. In the section on decision, in terms of 
What is Enlightenment?, we see that Kant does not maintain that people are determined 
when their acts do not represent the moral law but that they are cowardly and weak. In 
the Groundwork we see that what distinguishes finite rational agents from animals is that 
rational agents have the capacity to reason, and thus make decisions for something other 
than empirical incentives. Through this discussion, we know that Kant implicitly 
employed the notion of Willkiir. Furthermore, finite rational beings have the ability to 
choose the moral law or empirical incentives. Finite rational beings always know that 
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morally good decisions are those that are done for the moral law, and decisions, which 
are not from the moral law, are not determined, but are weak and cowardly. 
The section on responsibility demonstrates that Kant's moral philosophy holds 
people responsible for their decisions, thus people must be able to decide to do other than 
what they have chosen. Through the ability to choose, decide, or act and not merely 
react, rational beings (even when acting irrationally) are held accountable for their 
maxims and their actions. In this section, I deliver a response to critics, such as Sidgwick 
and Horenstein, who in my view draw an unfounded connection between freedom and 
moral behaviour from Kant's statement that, "a free will and a will under moral law are 
one and the same"(Kant, G 4:447). Although Kant does say that rational agents are free 
under the moral law he does not say whether rational agents can escape the moral law. I 
maintain that for Kant if one has reason, one certainly acknowledges the moral law since 
the moral law and freedom are reciprocal concepts: possessing the faculty of reason, (not 
through exercising reason but in possessing the ability to reason) shows that the moral 
law and freedom are both present. Nonetheless, a rational agent with such freedom can 
choose freely against the moral law. 
In chapter III, I give evidence that in the second Critique Kant maintains that 
maxims that are not for the sake of the moral law are free, and thus the actions that rest 
on these maxims are not determined by empirical incentives. The first section of this 
chapter addressed the 'gallows examples.' These examples demonstrate that finite 
rational beings are not determined to act by empirical incentives. Instead, we saw that 
Kant demonstrates that even when tempted by something as strong as lust, a finite 
rational agent remains free to act on an empirical incentive or for the sake of the moral 
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law. The next section in this chapter addresses incentives. I demonstrate that finite 
rational beings can choose to incorporate empirical and moral incentives into their 
maxims. In both of these instances, the incentives are freely incorporated into the 
maxims on which their actions are based. Finally, in section III of this chapter I 
discussed in what way actions are determined. All actions, even moral actions, are 
determined in time. Hence, an action is determined in the sense that some act must 
precede it and some action must follow it. However, this is not the same way in which 
some Kantian scholars claim that immoral actions are determined by empirical 
incentives. 
I have demonstrated that, for Kant, finite rational agents' acts are intentional, 
whether they are for the moral law or for empirical incentives. Just as rational agents 
cannot escape the moral law, they cannot escape the freedom of having to make decisions 
regarding which maxims to base their actions on. Therefore, for Kant, rational agents are 
held accountable or responsible for all of their intentional actions including the ones not 
in accordance with the moral law. In other words, "whenever I act, an incentive can only 
determine my will to an action insofar as I have incorporated that incentive into my 
maxim. Put differently: a desire, or any other incentive, cannot, by itself, move me to 
act; I have to allow it to move me." (Baron, "Henery Allison" 777) 
Section II: The Example of Suicide 
In my Introduction, I used the practical example of suicide to demonstrate the 
different ways in which Kantian scholars determine whether finite rational agents are free 
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when acting on maxims that are against the moral law. I gave two different 
interpretations regarding this example. 
The first interpretation is through employing Horenstein's, Fackenheim's, and 
Sidgwick's explanation ofKant's ethics. This interpretation leads to the conclusion that 
the maxim, which the act of suicide is based on, cannot be in accordance with moral law 
or in accordance with the laws of nature. As addressed in the Introduction, one 
formulation of the categorical is imperative is, "act as if the maxim of your action were to 
become by your will a universal law of nature." (Kant, G 4:421) From this formulation 
of the categorical imperative we see that the maxim, which the act of suicide rests on, is 
not done for the moral law. This is because the maxim to commit suicide cannot become 
a universal law of nature. Thus, maxims of suicide in such cases end life, while the 
natural law and the categorical imperative preserve life. If the only options were to act in 
accordance with the moral law or to be determined to act by the laws of nature, then this 
would be a problem for Kant. This is because, whether or not one is acting in accordance 
with the moral law, and therefore is free, or one is acting against the moral law, and is 
therefore determined, suicide is logically excluded as a possible action. 
However, a second explanation of the act of suicide is possible through 
introducing a third type of act. That is an act, which is not done for the sake of the moral 
law, and is not determined. In other words, finite rational agents are free to act against 
the moral law. If finite rational agents choose to commit suicide they are not acting as 
pure rational agents, and thus from reason alone, nor are they acting like animals, and 
thus from instinct alone. Instead, finite rational agents have the freedom to choose 
maxims that do not coincide with the moral law. Kant says "the faculty of desire in 
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accordance with concepts, insofar as the ground determining it to action lies within itself 
and not in its object, is a called a faculty to do or to refrain from doing as one pleases." 
(Kant, MM6:213) When the faculty of desire is joined with one's consciousness ofthe 
ability to bring about the object of desire, a choice is made. 
Therefore, we see that the choice to commit suicide is irrational, and thus 
immoral, yet one cannot be determined to commit suicide. However, one can now 
choose to act immorally. To act immorally or in an evil manner is not to act in 
accordance with a maxim from the moral law and not to be fully determined. In fact, 
Kant says that rational agents can never be fully determined. From this I infer that 
rational agents are responsible because they have the ability to do otherwise. Kant says 
"Human choice ... is a choice that can indeed be affected but is not determined by 
impulses." (Kant, MM 6:214) 
I have demonstrated that throughout all of Kant's moral philosophy Kant has 
maintained that there is an alternative to acting in accordance with the moral law or being 
determined by laws of nature. The alternative is that of choosing to act either for the 
moral law or against the moral law. In other words, finite rational agents always have to 
choose incentives and maxims. Unlike holy rational agents who have no choice because 
they only exist in the noumenal and thus always 'act' for the moral law, or animals who 
only exist in the phenomenal and thus have no choice but to act in accordance with the 
laws of nature, finite rational agents must always freely choose their maxims. Maxims 
are freely chosen whether they are in accordance with the moral law or not. 
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Section III: Responsibility 
As seen in the Introduction, Horenstein's, Fackenheim's, and Sidgwick's 
interpretation ofKant's ethics disagree with my interpretation of Kant's ethics. All three 
of these philosophers believe that Kant is inconsistent concerning his notion of freedom. 
Each of these scholars believes that at some point during Kant's moral philosophy, Kant 
maintained that finite rational agents are determined when they act on immoral actions. I 
would like to reflect on the impact of their interpretations to Kant's moral philosophy. 
Horenstein's, Fackenheim's, and Sidgwick's interpretation of Kant's notion of freedom 
leave the notion of moral responsibility omitted from Kant's moral philosophy. In other 
words, the implication of their interpretations, is that finite rational agents cannot be held 
responsible for their immoral actions. 
Horenstein claims, "few theories leave moral responsibility in so ambiguous a 
position does Kant's doctrine of the empirical and the intelligible character." (Horenstein, 
143) While Fackenheim states, "In so far as [a villain] wills at all, he wills the good; and 
in so far as he follows evil, he acts as determined, not by himself, but by an all-too-
powerful inclination ... [Thus, one] cannot justify moral responsibility." (Fackenheim, 
264) Paul Guyer, in "The Value ofReason and the Value of Freedom," states that 
Sidgwick's interpretation leads to "the possibility that freedom and adherence to the 
moral law may on Kant's account be so tightly linked that an immoral agent must be 
considered an unfree agent, and therefore not an agent responsible for his misdeeds." 
(Guyer, 34) 
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Thus, the conclusion from misinterpreting Kant's ethics in the way that these 
scholars have misinterpreted Kant is that Kant's ethic cannot hold finite rational agents 
responsible for their immoral actions. This conclusion is inconsistent with the rest of 
Kant's moral philosophy. Kant's moral philosophy focuses on obligation and duty. 
These concepts, as we have seen throughout this thesis, rely on one's ability to make 
choices. When one freely chooses, either in accordance with one's duty or against one's 
duty, one is responsible for their choices. 
A practical example of what the above interpretations lead to is the following. If 
a moral agent decides to do "what one ought to do", then he or she has made a morally 
good decision and he or she can be praised for this. However, it only makes sense to 
praise someone for the things that they are responsible for, for example, I do not praise 
my sister when she grows tall, however, I do praise her for being honest. On the other 
hand, if a moral agent goes against "what one ought to do" then he or she has made a 
morally wrong or bad decision (or a decision that was based on something other than 
moral importance), and is to be blamed for this decision. As in the case of praising 
someone, we can only blame the person who went against "what one ought to do" 
because one is responsible for choosing to act against "what one ought to have done." 
Also consider, for example, if my sister borrowed a piece of clothing from me and 
I ask her where it is, I hold her responsible for her answer whether it is truthful or 
dishonest. This is relevant because Horenstein, Fackenheim, and Sidgwick believe that 
Kant thought people were only free and thus responsible when they answer truthfully. 
This is because only a truthful answer is in accordance with the moral law, and only 
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when one acts 'under' the moral law is one free. However, this has been shown to be 
incorrect. 
In order for someone to be held responsible, it must be possible for that person to 
have done something other than what he or she has done; in other words, he or she cannot 
have been determined to act in any one way. Rational agents do not hold animals 
responsible for their actions in the same way that rational agents hold rational beings 
responsible. Animals do not choose to act; they merely act on instinct without the 
possibility for any rational thought influencing their decision. One cannot be held 
responsible if they do not have options because if there is no option, then this means that 
no decision can be made because there is nothing to decide between. If someone is 
determined to do something then there is no moral decision at hand, in other words, a 
determined action has no moral value. Instead it falls outside of the realm of morality. 
Determined actions in this instance do not refer to actions that one decides to take based 
on one's desire or interest. 'Determined' as I am using it here refers to those actions that 
one takes when they have no choices in their actions. 
Thus, I have argued throughout this discussion that Kant's moral philosophy is 
consistent in the assertion that finite rational beings are free to choose against the moral 
law. By interpreting Kant in this manner we see that finite rational agents are not at the 
mercy of their desires and are responsible for all of their actions even (especially) their 
immoral ones. Through my interpretation of Kant the act of suicide is not logically 
excluded from the realm of possible actions. I have demonstrated that acts are not limited 
to free moral acts or determined acts. Although the act of suicide is an irrational, or evil, 
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act it is still a free act, and agents performing such acts are still free and accountable 
under the moral law even while acting against it. 
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